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WASHINGTON’S REPRODUCTIVE PRIVACY ACT: AN 
INTERPRETATION AND CONSTITUTIONAL ANALYSIS  
Ross Tanaka 
Abstract: In Roe v. Wade, the Supreme Court declared that the “zone of privacy” inherent 
in the liberty component of the Due Process Clauses protected a woman’s right to choose 
when to terminate her pregnancy. Nevertheless, in the years following Roe, the Court held 
that the right of choice did not include a right to state assistance in obtaining an abortion. 
After decisions such as Webster v. Reproductive Services and Maher v. Roe, the state may 
express its preference for childbirth by denying the use of its funds, facilities, and personnel 
for abortion. Although a majority of the Court held that such selective funding did not violate 
the Constitution, certain Justices argued the state’s funding decision would have a coercive 
impact on a woman’s choice. In response to the Court’s decisions, Washington enacted the 
Reproductive Privacy Act, which requires that if the State directly or indirectly provides 
maternity care, it must also provide substantially equivalent abortion care. The Act also 
prevents the State from discriminating against the fundamental right of choice. No court, 
however, has interpreted the Act. Accordingly, this Comment analyzes the Privacy Act and 
suggests an interpretive framework for courts when determining whether the State has 
complied with the Act’s requirements. In addition, this Comment explores the tension 
between the Privacy Act and religious healthcare providers that may object to abortion, 
ultimately arguing that this Comment’s interpretation of the Privacy Act passes strict scrutiny 
under Article 1, section 11 of the Washington Constitution. 
 
INTRODUCTION 
Although Washington is a relatively secular state, it could soon have 
the highest concentration of Catholic-affiliated healthcare in the 
country.1 Catholic healthcare providers are some of the largest in the 
country. In 2011 “10 of the 25 largest health systems in the nation were 
Catholic” and two of those systems were in the top five largest non-
profit healthcare systems in the nation.2 Given its size, resources, and 
expertise, many Washington providers have turned to Catholic 
healthcare for support, either through a merger or an affiliation 
1. Kirk Johnson, Hospital Mergers Rest Abortion-Access Battle, N.Y. TIMES (May 12, 2013), 
http://www.nytimes.com/2013/05/13/us/hospital-mergers-in-northwest-raise-issue-of-abortion-
barriers.html. 
2. LOIS UTTLEY ET AL., MISCARRIAGE OF MEDICINE: THE GROWTH OF CATHOLIC HOSPITALS 
AND THE THREAT TO REPRODUCTIVE HEALTHCARE 5 (2013), available at https://www.aclu.org/ 
files/assets/growth-of-catholic-hospitals-2013.pdf. 
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agreement.3 If all of the pending deals go through, the number of 
Catholic-affiliated acute care beds in Washington may be as high as 
forty-four percent.4 
The growth of Catholic healthcare in Washington creates a conflict 
between religious exercise and certain fundamental reproductive rights. 
Catholic healthcare providers must abide by the Catholic Health 
Directives, which forbid health services like abortion, birth control, and 
end-of-life choices.5 As a result of agreements with Catholic providers, 
secular facilities may alter their services to comply with the Catholic 
Directives. For example, in Seattle, Swedish Health Services offered 
elective abortions for decades.6 But the hospital agreed to stop when it 
joined with Providence Health & Services, one of the largest Catholic 
systems in the country.7 
Nevertheless, when it comes to reproductive rights, Washington is 
one of the most protective in the country. Washington’s Reproductive 
Privacy Act (the “Act” or “Privacy Act”) declares that every woman has 
a fundamental right to choose or refuse an abortion and forbids the state 
from discriminating against the exercise of the fundamental right of 
choice.8 The Act also requires that the State provide substantially 
equivalent abortion care whenever the State provides maternity care.9 
Given the entanglement of state and private funds, which can occur 
through affiliation agreements between public and private providers, the 
State’s obligation to provide substantially equivalent abortion care could 
create a conflict for Catholic healthcare.10 
This Comment suggests a framework to interpret the Privacy Act and 
explores the tension it creates with free exercise interests.11 Part I of this 
3. See id. at 16. 
4. Id. 
5. See UTTLEY ET AL., supra note 2, at 2; U.S. CONFERENCE OF CATHOLIC BISHOPS, ETHICAL 
AND RELIGIOUS DIRECTIVES FOR CATHOLIC HEALTH CARE SERVICES 26 (2009), available at 
http://www.usccb.org/issues-and-action/human-life-and-dignity/health-care/upload/Ethical-Religious-
Directives-Catholic-Health-Care-Services-fifth-edition-2009.pdf. 
6. Reed Abelson, Catholic Hospitals Expand, Religious Strings Attached, N.Y. TIMES (Feb. 20, 
2012), http://www.nytimes.com/2012/02/21/health/policy/growth-of-catholic-hospitals-may-limit-access-
to-reproductive-care.html?_r=1&hpw. 
7. Id.  
8. WASH. REV. CODE § 9.02.100 (2), (4) (2014). 
9. Id. § 9.02.160. 
10. See infra Part II. 
11. Although this Comment examines the Privacy Act in light of the growth of Catholic 
healthcare in Washington, it is important to note that the Reproductive Privacy Act applies outside 
of that context. For example, shortly before this Comment went to print, the ACLU filed suit against 
Skagit Regional Health over a failure to provide substantially equivalent care under the Act. Amy 
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Comment provides background on federal substantive due process 
jurisprudence in some detail. Although the Act is a state law, its purpose 
and substance is integrally tied to the federal abortion jurisprudence. 
Detailing the evolution of substantive due process helps illustrate both 
the scope of the constitutional right of choice and the unique concerns 
underlying Washington’s choice to enact greater protection for abortion 
than currently exists at the federal level. Part II suggests an interpretation 
of the Act. Part III examines the potential conflict the Act creates for 
Catholic healthcare and explains why a potential free exercise challenge 
would probably be brought under the Washington, rather than the 
federal, Constitution. Finally, Part IV argues that the Act passes strict 
scrutiny under the Washington Constitution. 
I. FEDERAL SUBSTANTIVE DUE PROCESS AND ABORTION 
JURISPRUDENCE 
In 1973, the Supreme Court extended substantive due process 
protection to a woman’s right to choose when to terminate her 
pregnancy.12 Although the Constitution does not explicitly mention 
privacy, the Court recognized that a woman’s decision to terminate her 
pregnancy lies within a zone of privacy protected by the “liberty” 
component of the Fifth13 and Fourteenth14 Amendments’ Due Process 
Clause.15 This Part traces the doctrinal shifts in the Supreme Court’s 
substantive due process and abortion jurisprudence, focusing on the 
origins of Roe v. Wade16 and the constitutional limits of a woman’s right 
of choice. 
A. The Rise and Fall of Lochner and Economic Liberty 
Substantive due process doctrine recognizes that the Fifth and 
Fourteenth Amendment’s guarantee that the state shall not deprive any 
Radil, Skagit Hospital Creates Illegal Barriers for Abortion, ACLU Says, KUOW.ORG (Feb. 19, 
2015), http://kuow.org/post/skagit-hospital-creates-illegal-barriers-abortion-aclu-says. It does not 
appear that the alleged failure to provide substantially equivalent care was the result of an 
agreement between the hospital and a Catholic provider. 
12. Roe v. Wade, 410 U.S. 113 (1973).  
13. U.S. CONST. amend. V (“No person shall . . . be deprived of life, liberty, or property, without 
due process of law.”). 
14. U.S. CONST. amend. XIV, § 1 (“No state shall . . . deprive any person of life, liberty, or 
property, without due process of law.”). 
15. Roe, 410 U.S. at 152–53. 
16. See generally id. 
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person of “life, liberty, or property, without due process of law”17 goes 
beyond freedom from bodily restraint, encompassing other substantive 
limits on the government’s ability to act not specifically enumerated in 
the Constitution.18 Although the exact substance of those boundaries 
have changed over time, the general principle the Court adheres to in 
identifying due process rights has not. The doctrine is built on the 
assumption that although the government has the power to enact laws for 
the preservation of the public good, there are certain uses of the state’s 
authority that are antithetical to democratic governance.19 Thus, due 
process seeks to balance the state’s police power with the private 
sphere’s liberty. During the rise of laissez-faire economics in the early 
twentieth century, that liberty was defined in terms of economic 
freedom.20 Throughout this era, the Court consistently determined that 
the private ability to enter economic contracts was not an area of public 
interest, making it impervious to legislative action.21 
Lochner v. New York22 exemplified the Court’s libertarian approach to 
economic legislation. In that case, the Court struck down a law 
preventing bakers from working more than sixty hours in a week.23 The 
issue before the Court was whether the New York law was a valid 
exercise of the state’s police power or “an unreasonable, unnecessary, 
and arbitrary interference with the right of the individual to his personal 
liberty.”24 The Court determined that the law fell into the latter 
category.25 Because the amount of time a baker spent working had no 
relation to the quality of the bread, the New York law did not further the 
state’s legitimate interest in public health.26 Both the baker and the 
employer, as “grown and intelligent men,” were deemed capable of 
contracting for their own wellbeing without interference from the state.27 
17. See U.S. CONST. amends. V, XIV, § 1 (emphasis added). 
18. See Allgeyer v. Louisiana, 165 U.S. 578, 588 (1897). 
19. See Calder v. Bull, 3 U.S. (3 Dall.) 386, 387–88 (1798) (“There are acts which the Federal, or 
State, Legislature cannot do, without exceeding their authority. There are certain vital principles in 
our free Republican governments, which will determine and over-rule an apparent and flagrant 
abuse of legislative power . . . .”). 
20. See United States v. Lopez, 514 U.S. 549, 606 (1995). 
21. See, e.g., Lochner v. New York, 198 U.S. 45, 61 (1905). 
22. See generally id. 
23. See id. at 52, 57, 64–65. 
24. Id. at 56.  
25. See id. at 57. 
26. Id. 
27. Id. at 61. 
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The Court repudiated Lochner in West Coast Hotel v. Parrish,28 in 
part to facilitate the passage of remedial New Deal legislation.29 Since 
West Coast Hotel, the Court’s approach to economic legislation largely 
reflects the legal positivist30 approach espoused by Justice Holmes in his 
Lochner dissent.31 Though courts and commentators routinely reject 
Lochner and its reasoning,32 the case is nevertheless instructive. The 
foundation of the Court’s zone of privacy and abortion jurisprudence has 
roots in Lochner’s balancing of personal liberty and the state’s police 
powers.33 Implicit in the Lochner Court’s reasoning is an understanding 
of personal liberty as incorporating a degree of privacy in decision-
making.34 The Court did not dispute the potential harm to bakers, but 
28. 300 U.S. 379, 398–99 (1937). 
29. KATHLEEN SULLIVAN & NOAH FELDMAN, CONSTITUTIONAL LAW 377 (16th ed. 2007). 
30. Generally, the legal positivist theory holds that the legal system depends on certain structures 
of government, not whether the law satisfies normative ideals. Legal Positivism, STANFORD 
ENCYCLOPEDIA OF PHIL., http://plato.stanford.edu/entries/legal-positivism/ (last visited Apr. 28, 
2014). What laws are in force depends on the social standards that society recognizes as 
authoritative. Id.  
31. See Lochner, 198 U.S. at 75 (Holmes, J., dissenting) (“This case is decided upon an economic 
theory which a large part of the country does not entertain. . . . But I do not conceive that to be my 
duty, because I strongly believe that my agreement or disagreement has nothing to do with the right 
of a majority to embody their opinions in law.”). This view is reflected in the highly deferential 
approach the Court gave to economic legislation in the years following West Coast Hotel. See 300 
U.S. at 398–99 (reasoning that the legislature was entitled to determine that women were the ready 
victims of those who would take advantage of them and to adopt measures to reduce that evil); 
Williamson v. Lee Optical, 348 U.S. 483, 488 (1955) (establishing a highly deferential standard of 
judicial review: “[i]t is enough that there is an evil at hand for correction, and that it might be 
thought that the particular legislative measure was a rational way to correct it”). But see United 
States v. Carolene Prods. Co., 304 U.S. 144, 153 n.4 (1938) (arguing for a heightened standard of 
judicial review when the legislation implicates the rights of discrete and insular minorities who 
might be disadvantaged in the political process). 
32. See, e.g., Planned Parenthood of Se. Pa. v. Casey, 505 U.S. 833, 861–62 (1992) (plurality) 
(discussing the flaws in Lochner’s reasoning); Griswold v. Connecticut, 381 U.S. 479, 481–82 
(1965) (declining to apply Lochner); Amunrud v. Bd. of Appeals, 158 Wash. 2d 208, 228, 143 P.3d 
571, 580 (2006) (noting that the Lochner jurisprudence has been soundly rejected by the 
Washington and United States Supreme Courts). 
33. See Poe v. Ullman, 367 U.S. 497, 542 (Harlan, J., dissenting) (“Due process has not been 
reduced to any formula; its content cannot be determined by reference to any code. The best that can 
be said is that through the course of this Court’s decisions it has represented the balance which our 
Nation, built upon postulates of respect for the liberty of the individual, has struck between that 
liberty and the demands of organized society.”); Lochner, 198 U.S. at 53 (Peckham, J., majority) 
(“The right to purchase or to sell labor is part of the liberty protected by this amendment, unless 
there are circumstances which exclude the right. There are, however, certain powers, existing in the 
sovereignty of each state in the Union, somewhat vaguely termed police powers, the exact 
description and limitation of which have not been attempted by the courts.”). 
34. See Lochner, 198 U.S. at 57–58 (“The act must have a more direct relation, as a means to an 
end, and the end itself must be appropriate and legitimate, before an act can be held to be valid 
which interferes with the general right of an individual to be free in his person and in his power to 
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recognized that the legislature could not substitute its judgment for either 
the baker or the employer unless the state acted through a valid use of its 
power to further the public good.35 Lochner’s flaw lay in the Court’s 
determination that the New York law had no relation to public health.36 
However, the idea that certain decisions are immune from state action 
continues today.37 Though the following line of cases concerning 
personal autonomy leading to Roe represent a paradigm shift in the 
Court’s understanding of what constitutes the private sphere, the Court, 
as in Lochner, still looks to whether the state action exceeded its 
boundaries by intruding into an area of solely private concern. 
B. The Right to Autonomy in Personal Decision-Making 
Decided squarely within the Lochner era, the Court in Meyer v. 
Nebraska38 and Pierce v. Society of Sisters39 extended the concept of 
liberty in economic decision-making to autonomy in choices related to 
childrearing. In Meyer, the Court reversed the conviction of a teacher 
who violated state law by teaching German to his young students.40 The 
Court cast its protection as a right of the parents “to control the 
education of their own.”41 Similarly, in Pierce, the Court struck down an 
Oregon law requiring children between the ages of eight and sixteen to 
attend public school.42 Like Meyer, the Court in Pierce held that the law 
unreasonably interfered with the “liberty of parents and guardians to 
direct the upbringing and education of children.”43 The Court rejected 
the State’s argument that it needed to “use its power to achieve a very 
connective and communitarian goal of breaking down the barriers of 
contract in relation to his own labor.”). 
35. Id. at 57. 
36. See Washington v. Glucksberg, 521 U.S. 702, 761 (1997) (Souter, J., concurring) (“[W]hile 
the cases in the Lochner line routinely invoked a correct standard of constitutional arbitrariness 
review, they harbored the spirit of Dred Scott in their absolutist implementation of the standard they 
espoused.”); John Hart Ely, The Wages of Crying Wolf: A Comment on Roe v. Wade, 82 YALE L.J. 
920, 941 (1973) (“Thus the test Lochner and its progeny purported to apply is that which would 
theoretically control the same question today: whether a plausible argument can be made that the 
legislative action furthers some permissible governmental goal. The trouble, of course, is they 
misapplied it.”). 
37. See Lawrence v. Texas, 539 U.S. 558, 573–74 (2003). 
38. 262 U.S. 390 (1923). 
39. 268 U.S. 510 (1925). 
40. Meyer, 262 U.S. at 400, 403. 
41. Id. at 401. 
42. 268 U.S. at 530–31, 534–35. 
43. Id. at 534–35.  
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race, sect, class and ethnicity by educating children all together”44 as “a 
threat to ‘standardize . . . the child [as] a mere creature of the state.’”45 
Here, the Court’s reference to standardization marks the critical point in 
the balancing between individual liberty and state control.46 The Court 
did not question the government’s power to “compel attendance at some 
school” or to “prescribe a curriculum.”47 These legitimate pedagogical 
concerns, however, gave way to individual liberty when the state 
exceeded its bounds by standardizing children.48 
The Meyer and Pierce decisions created an early due process 
formulation inextricably linked with the Court’s conception of 
personhood.49 Instead of following Lochner’s economic focus, the Court 
shifted its understanding of the private sphere to decisions that, as 
Planned Parenthood of Southeastern Pennsylvania v. Casey50 later 
articulated, “define one’s own concept of existence, of meaning, of the 
universe, and of the mystery of human life.”51 The Court’s rhetoric 
suggests that children were viewed as extensions of their parents.52 As 
such, childrearing and education lay within a personal private sphere; 
state intrusion into those bounds was illicit “standardization.” In this 
way, these two decisions function as a bridge between the economic 
Lochner line of cases and the later privacy strand of due process. Like 
Lochner, Pierce and Meyer focus on autonomy in decision-making. The 
difference being that instead of privacy in economic decision-making, 
Pierce and Meyer recognize a sphere of autonomy in decisions relating 
to personhood and the ability to shape that which is directly under one’s 
44. Elizabeth A. Reilly, The Rhetoric of Disrespect: Uncovering the Faulty Premises Infecting 
Reproductive Rights, 5 AM. U. J. GENDER & L. 147, 190 (1996). 
45. Id. (quoting Pierce, 268 U.S. at 535). 
46. See Pierce, 268 U.S. at 535 (“The fundamental theory of liberty upon which all governments 
in this Union repose excludes any general power of the state to standardize its children by forcing 
them to accept instruction from public teachers only.”). 
47. Meyer v. Nebraska, 262 U.S. 390, 402 (1923). 
48. See Reilly, supra note 44, at 191. 
49. See Jed Rubenfeld, The Right of Privacy, 102 HARV. L. REV. 737, 752 (1989) (“Whatever its 
genesis, ‘personhood’ has so invaded privacy doctrine that it now regularly is seen either as the 
value underlying the right or as a synonym for the right itself.”). But, as Professor Rubenfeld notes, 
“[d]espite its ubiquity, ‘personhood’ remains rather ill-defined. The word is meant, it seems, to 
capture some essence of our being—‘those attributes . . . irreducible in [one’s] selfhood’—with 
which the state must not be allowed to tamper. Yet the concept has a certain opacity, greater perhaps 
than that of analogous but no less abstract terms such as ‘dignity’ or ‘liberty.’” Id. at 753. 
50. 505 U.S. 833, 851 (1992) (plurality). 
51. Id. at 851. 
52. Meyer, 262 U.S. at 401 (remarking that the liberty guarantee included “the power of parents 
to control the education of their own” (emphasis added)). 
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control.53 As the Pierce and Meyer line progresses, the Court shifts its 
focus inward, finding a sphere of autonomy in decisions relating to one’s 
body. 
Griswold v. Connecticut54 announced the right to privacy used in the 
later abortion cases.55 In Griswold, the Court struck down Connecticut 
statutes prohibiting the use and distribution of contraceptive devices.56 
The plaintiffs were the directors of a Planned Parenthood clinic who 
were arrested and charged with dispensing birth control to married 
women.57 The majority found that “the specific guarantees in the Bill of 
Rights have penumbras, formed by emanations from those guarantees 
that help give them life and substance.”58 Those various guarantees 
create a “zone of privacy.”59 The Constitution protects that zone of 
privacy.60 Importantly, the Griswold decision did not enshrine a right to 
contraception in the Constitution.61 Rather, the zone of privacy only 
forbade the government from entering that sphere.62 This is consistent 
with the general principle that the Due Process Clauses do not require 
the state to affirmatively act to protect liberty.63 Rather, they are merely 
a limitation on the state’s power that prevents it from asserting its 
authority within the private sphere. 
Seven years later, the Court realized the “generative potential” of the 
decision in Eisenstadt v. Baird,64 extending Griswold to unmarried 
53. See id. 
54. 381 U.S. 479 (1965). 
55. Rubenfeld, supra note 49, at 744. 
56. Id. at 744–45. 
57. David B. Cruz, “The Sexual Freedom Cases”? Contraception, Abortion, Abstinence, and the 
Constitution, 35 HARV. C.R.- C.L. L. REV. 299, 307 (2000). 
58. Griswold, 381 U.S. at 484. 
59. Id.  
60. Id. 
61. Ely, supra note 36, at 930. 
62. DeShaney v. Winnebago Cnty. Dep’t of Soc. Servs., 489 U.S. 189, 196 (1989). In DeShaney, 
the Court dismissed an action brought by the mother of Joshua DeShaney, who was beaten and 
permanently injured by his father. Id. at 191. The mother sued social workers who failed to 
recognize the abuse and take action, claiming that the inaction deprived the boy of “liberty” 
guaranteed by the Due Process Clause. Id. at 193. Writing for the Court, Chief Justice Rehnquist 
observed that “[t]he Clause is phrased as a limitation on the State’s power to act, not as a guarantee 
of certain minimal levels of safety and security. It forbids the State itself to deprive individuals of 
life, liberty, or property without ‘due process of law,’ but its language cannot fairly be extended to 
impose an affirmative obligation on the State to ensure that those interests do not come to harm 
through other means.” Id. at 196; see also Lindsey v. Normet, 405 U.S. 56, 74 (1972) (no obligation 
to provide adequate housing); Youngberg v. Romero, 457 U.S. 307, 317 (1982). 
63. Id.  
64. 405 U.S. 438 (1972); RICHARD A. POSNER, SEX AND REASON 329 (1992). 
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persons.65 “While in Griswold ‘the right of privacy in question inhered 
in the marital relationship,’” the Eisenstadt Court “treated the presence 
of a marital relationship as an inessential feature of the Griswold 
decision.”66 The result was an “aggressively individualistic view of 
constitutional rights.”67 While never abandoning Griswold’s concern for 
bringing the full force of criminal law into the bedroom, Eisenstadt 
confirmed that the right of privacy and the associational right central to 
sexuality inhered on an individual basis.68 The Griswold line of cases 
provides a vague picture of what rights fall within the “zone of privacy.” 
The cases leading up to Roe v. Wade define a due process right to 
marriage,69 procreation,70 contraception,71 and childrearing and 
education.72 While repudiating Lochner, the Court nevertheless invoked 
the same notion of the private sphere, recast as a zone of privacy. Thus, 
while the privacy strand of cases looks very different from, and 
expressly repudiates, the Lochner line, the methodology in the Court’s 
decision-making is strikingly similar. 
C. Modern Abortion Jurisprudence: Casey and the Government 
Funding Decisions 
Roe v. Wade announced that the “right of privacy” recognized in 
Griswold was broad enough to cover a woman’s decision to terminate 
her pregnancy. The opinion did not rely on the “obvious contraception-
abortion comparison and indeed [gave] no sign that it [found] Griswold 
stronger precedent than a number of other cases.”73 Rather, the Court 
found a privacy interest in a woman’s suffering in carrying a baby to 
65. Eisenstadt, 405 U.S. at 453–55. 
66. Cruz, supra note 57, at 309. 
67. Id. 
68. See Eisenstadt, 405 U.S. at 453 (“Yet the marital couple is not an independent entity with a 
mind and heart of its own, but an association of two individuals each with a separate intellectual and 
emotional makeup.”).  
69. Loving v. Virginia, 388 U.S. 1, 12 (1967). The decision primarily relied on the Equal 
Protection Clause but also found a substantive due process right to marriage. Id.  
70. Skinner v. Oklahoma, 316 U.S. 535, 541 (1942); Washington v. Glucksberg, 521 U.S. 702, 
720 (1997). 
71. Eisenstadt, 405 U.S. at 453. 
72. Pierce v. Soc’y of Sisters of the Holy Names of Jesus & Mary, 268 U.S. 510, 534–35 (1925). 
73. Ely, supra note 36, at 929 n.68; Richard A. Epstein, Substantive Due Process by Any Other 
Name: The Abortion Cases, 1973 SUP. CT. REV. 159, 169 (1973) (remarking that “the Supreme 
Court appeared to go out of its way to distinguish Griswold from the abortion cases, treating it as 
just one of many cases that recognized the right of privacy”). 
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term.74 Planned Parenthood v. Casey later explained that the unique 
burden a woman must bear in carrying a child is “too intimate and 
personal for the State to insist, without more, upon its own vision of the 
woman’s role” in the pregnancy.75 The Court tied its perception of 
personhood and a woman’s right to define her “own concept of . . . the 
universe”76 to the intimate bond, formed by suffering, between the 
mother and her child.77 
Although Roe v. Wade created a trimester framework for analyzing 
how the state could regulate a woman’s right to abort,78 Casey 
abandoned that method of analysis. Casey affirmed Roe’s central 
holding that a woman has a fundamental right to terminate her 
pregnancy.79 However, it identified two countervailing interests: the 
state’s interest in the fetus’s potential for human life80 and the health of 
the mother.81 Prior to fetal viability, the woman’s privacy interest 
outweighs the state’s interest in protecting the potential for human life.82 
Accordingly, prior to viability, the state can neither proscribe nor place 
an “undue burden” on a woman’s right to obtain an abortion.83 Courts 
will consider a law an “undue burden” if “its purpose or effect is to place 
substantial obstacles in the path of a woman seeking an abortion before 
the fetus attains viability.”84 Subsequent to viability, the scales tip in 
favor of the state. The strength of the potential for human life permits the 
state to “‘regulate, and even proscribe abortion except where it is 
necessary, in appropriate medical judgment, for the preservation of the 
life or health of the mother.’”85 
Even though Casey affirmed Roe’s holding that a woman has a 
fundamental right of choice in terminating her pregnancy, the Court’s 
74. Roe v. Wade, 410 U.S. 113, 153 (1973). 
75. 505 U.S. 833, 852 (1992).  
76. Id. at 851. 
77. Id. at 852.  
78. Roe, 410 U.S. at 164–65. 
79. Casey, 505 U.S. at 834. 
80. Id. at 870. The Court recognized that a fetus is not a “‘person’” for the purposes of the 
Constitution. Roe, 410 U.S. at 157–58. The opposite conclusion would demand prohibition of 
abortion in all circumstances, regardless of whether the woman was raped or if the life of the mother 
is in danger. See id. at 157 n.54. Even the Texas statute in Roe did not countenance this result. Id. 
81. See Jared H. Jones, Women’s Reproductive Rights Concerning Abortion, and Governmental 
Regulation Thereof—Supreme Court Cases, 20 A.L.R. FED. 2D 1 (2007). 
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decisions since Roe placed a number of caveats on a woman’s right of 
choice. For example, the Court made clear that the state may allocate its 
resources in such a way that expresses its preference for childbirth over 
abortion.86  The Court has upheld both state and federal regulations that 
either provide funding for childbirth but not abortion87 or deny 
government funding for abortion outright.88 In Harris v. McRae89 the 
Court upheld the constitutionality of the Hyde Amendments, which 
barred Medicaid funding even for most medically necessary abortions.90 
The Court noted that nothing in Roe or its progeny forbade the state 
from realizing its preference for childbirth over abortion through the 
allocation of public funds.91 The Court drew a distinction between 
“direct state interference with a protected activity and state 
encouragement of an alternative activity,” saving the Amendments from 
constitutional infirmity.92 Further, by denying the use of government 
money for abortions, the state placed no obstacle in a woman’s path. 
Rather, the woman’s indigency, which the state was under no obligation 
to cure, prevented her from obtaining an abortion.93 This reasoning 
follows from the well-established principle that the Due Process Clauses 
generally confer no affirmative right to governmental aid, “even where 
such aid may be necessary to secure life, liberty, or property interests of 
which the government itself may not deprive the individual.”94 
The Court extended this logic to state laws barring state employees 
from performing abortions and from the use of state facilities for 
abortion procedures.95 In Webster v. Reproductive Health Services,96 the 
Court upheld a Missouri law that barred state employees from 
performing abortions and the use of state facilities for abortions.97 In 
86. See Maher v. Roe, 432 U.S. 464, 470 (1977). 
87. See, e.g., id. (upholding against Equal Protection challenge the constitutionality of 
Connecticut regulations granting Medicaid benefits for childbirth but not medically unnecessary 
abortions); Poelker v. Doe, 432 U.S. 519, 521 (1977) (“[W]e find no constitutional violation by the 
city of St. Louis in electing, as a policy choice, to provide publicly financed hospital services for 
childbirth without providing corresponding services for nontherapeutic abortions.”). 
88. Harris v. McRae, 448 U.S. 297, 302, 326 (1980). 
89. 448 U.S. 297 (1980). 
90. Id. at 302, 326. 
91. Id. at 314.  
92. Id. at 315 (quoting Maher, 432 U.S. at 475).  
93. Id. at 317. 
94. DeShaney v. Winnebago Cnty. Dep’t of Soc. Servs., 489 U.S. 189, 196 (1989).   
95. Webster v. Reprod. Health Servs., 492 U.S. 490, 509 (1989). 
96. 492 U.S. 490 (1989). 
97. Id. at 509. 
 
                                                     
18 - Tanaka.docx (Do Not Delete) 6/3/2015  1:35 PM 
1004 WASHINGTON LAW REVIEW [Vol. 90:993 
upholding the statute, the Court placed the restriction in the same 
category as the previously affirmed funding limitations in Harris and 
progeny, stating that “[n]othing in the Constitution requires States to 
enter or remain in the business of performing abortions.”98 Just as the 
Court’s decision in Harris left women with the same array of choices as 
if the government had never sponsored healthcare,99 Missouri’s refusal 
to make its medical employees or facilities available for abortion 
procedures placed women in the same position as if the state had never 
built hospitals in the first place.100 
Thus, while women retain a fundamental right to terminate their 
pregnancy, crippling limitations severely limit that right’s efficacy. 
Although the government may not place an obstacle that unduly burdens 
a woman’s right of choice,101 it may withhold the funds, facilities, or 
personnel necessary to perform an abortion. For the millions of women 
who cannot afford private healthcare or live in rural areas with access to 
fewer hospitals, such government limitations could have a drastic impact 
on their choice between abortion and childbirth. In response to these 
limited constitutional protections, Washington voters adopted more 
protective measures for women seeking an abortion. 
II. WASHINGTON’S REPRODUCTIVE PRIVACY ACT 
Washington adopted its Reproductive Privacy Act as a part of 
Initiative 120 in 1991.102 The driving force behind the Act’s enactment 
was a growing concern that the Supreme Court would overturn Roe v. 
Wade.103 The Privacy Act sought to provide an alternate basis for the 
right of choice outlined in Roe, and enshrined, through statutory means, 
a fundamental right for women to choose or refuse an abortion.104 The 
Act, however, goes beyond merely declaring the existence of a 
fundamental right of choice. It takes affirmative measures to prevent the 
State from skewing the decision-making process in favor of childbirth 
98. Id. at 510. 
99. Harris v. McRae, 448 U.S. 297, 317 (1980). 
100. Webster, 492 U.S. at 509.  
101. See, e.g., Planned Parenthood of Se. Pa. v. Casey, 505 U.S. 833, 893 (1992). 
102. Whether a Public Hospital District Violates RCW 9.02 If It Contracts with a Provider of 
Health Services that Declines to Provide Certain Services, 2013 Op. Wash. Att’y Gen. 3, 4 (Aug. 
21, 2013), available at http://www.atg.wa.gov/ago-opinions/whether-public-hospital-district-
violates-rcw-902-if-it-contracts-provider-health-care [hereinafter 2013 Attorney General Opinion]. 
103. WASH. SEC’Y OF STATE, OFFICIAL VOTERS PAMPHLET (GENERAL ELECTION, NOVEMBER 5, 
1991) 14 (1991). 
104. Id. 
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over abortion. 
The Privacy Act addresses the concerns espoused by dissenting 
Justices in the Harris-Webster line of cases. In his Harris dissent, Justice 
Brennan disagreed with the majority’s holding that selective funding had 
no influence on a woman’s choice.105 Justice Brennan did not dispute the 
majority’s argument that, in the abstract, the government did not place 
an affirmative obstacle in a woman’s path when it chose to fund 
childbirth over abortion.106 As a practical matter, however, “funding all 
of the expenses associated with childbirth and none of the expenses 
incurred in terminating pregnancy” coerced women into choosing 
childbirth by making them an offer they could not refuse.107 “[M]any 
poverty-stricken women [would] choose to carry their pregnancy to term 
simply because the Government provide[d] funds for the associated 
medical services, even though [the] same women would have chosen to 
have an abortion if the Government had also paid for that option,” or if 
the Government had never gotten involved in the first place.108 Thus, 
according the Justice Brennan, the state could use its “largesse” to 
discriminate against the exercise of fundamental liberties with the same 
effectiveness as an outright denial of those liberties through criminal 
sanctions.109 
The Privacy Act addresses these concerns through two provisions: 
RCW 9.02.160 and RCW 9.02.100. RCW 9.02.160 requires that: 
If the state provides, directly or by contract, maternity care 
benefits, services, or information to women through any 
program administered or funded in whole or in part by the state, 
the state shall also provide women otherwise eligible for any 
such program with substantially equivalent benefits, services, or 
information to permit them to voluntarily terminate their 
pregnancies.110 
This provision addresses concerns that selective funding has a direct 
influence on a woman’s choice to terminate her pregnancy. It prevents 
the State from funding childbirth but not abortion.111 
105. Harris v. McRae, 448 U.S. 297, 333–34 (1980) (Brennan, J., dissenting). 
106. Id. at 333. 
107. Id. at 333–34. 
108. Id. at 334. 
109. Id. 
110. WASH. REV. CODE § 9.02.160 (2014). 
111. 11th Hour Election Guide—Initiative 120: Abortion Rights, SEATTLE TIMES, Nov. 3, 1991, 
at B6 (describing that “equivalent benefits” would require the state to be neutral in offering poor 
women options in pregnancy); Joan Fitzpatrick, Initiative 120—Should Abortion Laws Be 
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Next, RCW 9.02.100 places an additional obligation on the State 
when it provides abortion care. RCW 9.02.100(2) declares that “[e]very 
woman has the fundamental right to choose or refuse to have an 
abortion,” except as otherwise limited by the Privacy Act.112 RCW 
9.02.100(4) prohibits the State from discriminating against the exercise 
of that right in its provision of benefits, facilities, services, or 
information.113 Unlike RCW 9.02.160, which is concerned with the right 
of choice,114 RCW 9.02.100(4) addresses the exercise of that right.115 
Taken together, these provisions require that the State meet a certain 
minimum standard when it provides abortion care. From the plain 
language, it is evident that the State cannot discriminate against exercise 
of the right of choice, and when it provides maternity care, it must also 
provide substantially equivalent abortion care. But the Act does not 
define “substantially equivalent” and provides no guidance as to what 
constitutes discrimination. Can the State, for example, fulfill its 
obligation under the Act by only providing abortion information but not 
the actual procedure? Similarly, could the State permissibly provide the 
abortion care at a facility separate from the maternity care? Thus far, the 
Washington Attorney General is the only authority to have interpreted 
the Act. The Attorney General’s opinion concluded that when a public 
hospital district contracts with a private provider for the provision of 
maternity care, it has an obligation to provide substantially equivalent 
abortion care under RCW 9.02.160.116 A failure to provide that abortion 
care constituted a violation of both RCW 9.02.160 and 9.02.100(4).117 
But the opinion leaves several key questions unanswered. First, it only 
considers the obligations of a public hospital district that contracts with a 
private provider—it does not delve into whether other healthcare 
providers can trigger the Act.118 Second, it provides no guidance as to 
Revised?—Yes, SEATTLE TIMES, Oct. 13, 1991, at A17 (“Initiative 120 also assures that the state 
will remain evenhanded in its provision of health care for pregnant low-income women.”); see Carol 
M. Ostrom, Pro-Choice Groups Gather Money and Names for Initiative, SEATTLE TIMES, Aug. 22, 
1990, at H1 (describing that the Court’s Webster decision helped catalyze the formation of the 
PACs that sponsored Initiative 120). 
112. WASH. REV. CODE § 9.02.100(2). 
113. Id. § 9.02.100(4). 
114. See supra note 111 and accompanying text; Harris v. McRae, 448 U.S. 297, 333–34 (1980) 
(Brennan, J., dissenting). 
115. See WASH. REV. CODE § 9.02.100(4) (forbidding the state from discriminating against the 
exercise of the right of choice). 
116. 2013 Attorney General Opinion, supra note 102, at 9. 
117. Id. 
118. See generally id. at 5–8. 
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what constitutes substantially equivalent abortion care under RCW 
9.02.160.119 Finally, although it suggests that a failure to provide 
substantially equivalent abortion care violates both RCW 9.02.160 and 
RCW 9.02.100(4), the opinion does not provide an effective way to 
harmonize the two provisions.120 
Ultimately, this Comment seeks to answer the questions left open by 
the Attorney General’s opinion, and offers a framework for courts to 
apply the Act. It suggests that, like the Attorney General, courts should 
first engage in an analysis under RCW 9.02.160. They should determine 
whether, under the specific facts presented, the State has an obligation to 
provide abortion care, and if it does, whether the provided abortion care 
is substantially equivalent. Second, if the State is unable to meet its 
substantially equivalent obligation, courts should evaluate whether the 
State discriminated against a woman’s exercise of the right of choice in 
violation of RCW 9.02.100(4). This Comment analyzes these questions 
in turn. 
A. Substantially Equivalent Abortion Care Under RCW 9.02.160 
RCW 9.02.160 applies only when two conditions are met. First, at 
least a portion of the maternity care benefits, services, or information 
must be provided by the “state.”121 The Act’s definition of state includes 
the State of Washington, “counties, cities, towns, municipal 
corporations, and quasi-municipal corporations.”122 Second, the State 
must provide, “directly or by contract, maternity care benefits, services, 
or information” (hereinafter “maternity care”), through a program that is 
administered in whole or in part by the State.123 “Maternity care” 
includes a broad spectrum of “prenatal, childbirth, and postpartum 
services and information,”124 ranging from inpatient and outpatient 
medical care, public health nursing assessment and follow-up, 
psychological assessment and counseling, outreach services, family 
planning services, nutritional assessment and counseling, and financial 
aid.125 The definition of “program” administered or funded in whole or 
in part by the State has a similarly broad scope. The Attorney General 
119. See generally id. 
120. See generally id. 
121. See id. at 4–5. 
122. WASH. REV. CODE § 9.02.170(6) (2014). 
123. Id. § 9.02.160. 
124. 2013 Attorney General Opinion, supra note 102, at 6. 
125. Id. at 5. 
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has interpreted the definition of “program” such that any time the State 
administers or funds the provision of maternity care, it is engaged in a 
program for the purposes of the Act, even if the State only funds a 
portion of the care.126 It is important to note that health care facilities can 
avoid triggering RCW 9.02.160 by using private funds—instead of state 
funds—for maternity care, or by not providing maternity care at all.127 
Thus, the State has an obligation to provide substantially equivalent 
abortion care in a variety of circumstances. These instances are best 
divided into two categories: private healthcare facilities and public 
healthcare facilities. 
1. Private Healthcare Facilities 
A private medical facility is “any medical facility that is not owned or 
operated by the state.”128 Private healthcare facilities may trigger the 
State’s obligation in two instances. The first is when the facility 
furnishes maternity care with state funding from Medicaid or CHIP, 
which are “programs” within the meaning of the Act.129 The second is 
when a public hospital district contracts with a private healthcare 
provider for the construction or operation of a hospital, but the private 
provider ultimately owns and operates the hospital.130 This was the case 
in the recent agreement between PeaceHealth and San Juan County 
Public Hospital District Number 1. Pursuant to that agreement, the 
public hospital district subsidized the construction of a new hospital131 
that would serve county residents, but the ultimate ownership and 
operation of the hospital lay with PeaceHealth.132 Therefore, the new 
facility remained private in nature.133 Finally, in the case of private 
facilities, the obligation to provide abortion care remains with the State, 
making the State partially dependent on the private provider’s 
126. Id. at 7; WASH. REV. CODE § 9.02.160.  
127. 2013 Attorney General Opinion, supra note 102, at 6; WASH. REV. CODE § 9.02.160 
(providing that the state shall provide abortion care when the state provides maternity care). 
128. WASH. REV. CODE § 9.02.170(7). 
129. See 2013 Attorney General Opinion, supra note 102, at 7 (finding “funding mechanisms” to 
be within the definition of program). 
130. See id. at 8 (“It therefore follows that if a public hospital district contracts for the provision 
of maternity care benefits, services, or information to women, and subsidizes those benefits through 
public funds, it is required to provide the substantially equivalent [abortion care].”). 
131. See Subsidy Agreement for a Combined Clinic and Hospital Facility ¶ 2.1.2 (May 6, 2009), 
available at http://sjcphd.org/wp-content/uploads/2011/02/PIMC-Subsidy-Agreement-Contract.pdf. 
132. See id. at ¶¶ 1.1.1, 1.1.11. 
133. See WASH. REV. CODE § 9.02.170(7). 
 
                                                     
18 - Tanaka.docx (Do Not Delete) 6/3/2015  1:35 PM 
2015] THE REPRODUCTIVE PRIVACY ACT 1009 
accommodation.134 
2. Public Healthcare Facilities 
Public healthcare facilities also trigger RCW 9.02.160. Public 
facilities are those that are owned or operated by the State,135 and 
include hospitals that are owned or operated by a public hospital 
district.136 Similarly, public hospitals that contract with private providers 
can remain public, so long as ultimate ownership or operation of the 
hospital remains with the State.137 For example, based on a letter of 
intent between the University of Washington and PeaceHealth, the two 
parties would collaborate in the provision of services through UW 
Medicine,138 but the University would retain ownership and control.139 
Thus, under the terms of the letter of intent, UW Medicine remained a 
public facility, and as a subdivision of the State, would be obligated to 
provide substantially equivalent abortion care if it provided maternity 
care.140 
3. Substantially Equivalent 
Once a provider triggers RCW 9.02.160, the State must provide 
substantially equivalent abortion care. Although the Act does not define 
“substantially equivalent,” the statute’s purpose provides guidance.141 
The driving force behind RCW 9.02.160 was the State’s evenhanded 
provision of maternity and abortion care.142 Therefore, the abortion 
134. See id. § 9.02.160 (providing that the state shall provide substantially equivalent abortion 
care). 
135. See id. § 9.02.170(7) (defining private facilities as those that are neither owned nor operated 
by the state). Although the Act does not define public facilities, this Comment treats facilities that 
are not private as public. 
136. See id. § 9.02.170(6) (defining state to include municipal and quasi-municipal corporations); 
id. § 9.02.160 (providing that any time the State provides maternity care directly, it must provide 
equivalent abortion care). 
137. See generally id. § 9.02.170(7). 
138. Letter of Intent ¶ 1.5 (May 20, 2013), available at https://www.documentcloud.org/ 
documents/703136-fully-executed-loi-both-parties.html. 
139. Id. ¶ 2.1. 
140. WASH. REV. CODE § 9.02.170(6); id. § 9.02.160. 
141. Amalgamated Transit Union Local 587 v. State, 142 Wash. 2d 183, 205–06, 11 P.3d 762, 
780 (2000) (“Thus, in determining the meaning of a statute enacted through the initiative process, 
the court’s purpose is to ascertain the collective intent of the voters who, acting in their legislative 
capacity, enacted the measure . . . . [I]f there is ambiguity in the enactment, the court may examine 
the statements in the voters pamphlet in order to determine the voters’ intent.”). 
142. See supra note 111 and accompanying text. 
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services, benefits, or information should be proportional to the state-
funded or -administered maternity care at the facility. If a facility 
provides a means for women to deliver children, the State must provide 
a means for those women to terminate their pregnancy. If a provider 
only supplies information on childbirth, the State must also provide 
information on abortion. In other words, the equivalent abortion care 
must be substantial enough that a woman does not feel compelled to 
choose childbirth because the State has appropriated its resources in such 
a way so as to make it a more attractive option.143 
The application of the substantially equivalent inquiry is relatively 
straightforward when the State is able to provide abortion care and 
maternity care in the same facility; courts can make a side-by-side 
comparison. The inquiry, however, becomes more difficult when the 
State must provide the maternity care and abortion care at separate 
facilities. Consider this hypothetical: A public hospital district and a 
Catholic healthcare provider contract for the construction and operation 
of a new healthcare facility that will provide a full range of maternity 
care. Under the terms of the agreement, the public hospital district will 
contribute over ninety percent of the funding for the project, but the 
Catholic provider will retain ultimate ownership and control. Therefore, 
the facility is private within the meaning of the Act.144 Under RCW 
9.02.150, “[n]o person or private medical facility may be required by 
law or contract in any circumstances to participate in the performance of 
an abortion if such person or private medical facility objects to so 
doing.”145 Thus, the private provider could refuse to facilitate the State’s 
provision of the abortion care.146 But asserting the right to refuse to 
participate in the performance of an abortion does not relieve the State of 
its obligation under the Act.147 Instead, the State would have to provide a 
143. Id. 
144. See WASH. REV. CODE § 9.02.170(7) (“‘Private medical facility’ means any medical facility 
that is not owned or operated by the state.”). 
145. Id. § 9.02.150. 
146. Id. Similarly, doctors can opt out of providing an abortion. Id. This is at issue in the ACLU’s 
recent suit against Skagit Regional Health. Although the facts are unclear at this stage in the 
litigation, it appears that, allegedly, Skagit Regional Health permits doctors to opt out of providing 
abortions and instead has an unwritten policy of referring patients seeking abortion to an alternate 
facility. See Annie Zak, Washington ACLU Sues Skagit Regional Health over Abortion Services, 




147. See WASH. REV. CODE § 9.02.160 (“[T]he state shall also provide . . . substantially 
equivalent benefits, services, or information to permit them to terminate their pregnancies.”); Am. 
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means for women to terminate their pregnancy at an alternate facility, 
and a court would evaluate whether that care was substantially 
equivalent. 
Courts should evaluate the State’s provision of maternity care at an 
alternate facility based on the Act’s purpose—the evenhanded provision 
of maternity and abortion care.148 Thus, the inquiry is qualitative and 
should take into account the practical concerns faced by those to whom 
the Act applies—low-income women qualifying for state assistance.149 
The first consideration is whether women know of the availability of 
abortion at the separate facility. At the very least, this would require the 
private provider to refer women to the State’s alternate facility and 
provide a minimal amount of information on abortion.150 This 
requirement is essential for the State to meet its obligation. First, if a 
physician could remain silent or refuse to provide abortion advice 
without referral, women may construe that as medical advice to forego 
an abortion.151 Additionally, placing the burden to seek alternate 
abortion care entirely on women is not substantially equivalent. To be 
sure, some women could inform themselves about alternate care without 
the advice of a doctor. But many women may have insufficient access to 
resources to gather information. According to Census data, although 
roughly seventy-five percent of households in America have internet 
access, that number drops to less than sixty-seven percent in black or 
Hispanic households, and falls to roughly fifty percent in households 
with an annual income of less than 25,000 dollars or without a high 
school degree.152 Further, even if a patient has access to resources, a 
general lack of knowledge raises questions about whether self-education 
Legion Post # 149 v. Wash. State Dep’t of Health, 164 Wash. 2d 570, 588, 192 P.3d 306, 315 
(2008) (“This court assumes the legislature does not intend to create inconsistent statutes. Statutes 
are to be read together, whenever possible, to achieve a harmonious total statutory 
scheme . . . which maintains the integrity of the respective statutes.” (alteration in original) 
(citations omitted) (internal quotation marks omitted)). 
148. See supra note 111 and accompanying text. 
149. See WASH. REV. CODE § 9.02.160 (“[T]he state shall also provide women otherwise eligible 
for any such program with substantially equivalent benefits, services, or information to permit them 
to voluntarily terminate their pregnancies.” (emphasis added)). 
150. See Diana Lara et al., Knowledge of Abortion Laws and Services Among Low-Income 
Women in Three United States Cities, J. IMMIGRANT MINORITY HEALTH, at *2 (2014) (“Lack of 
knowledge about abortion laws and services might also influence ability to access abortion services 
in a timely manner . . . .”). 
151. See Rust v. Sullivan, 500 U.S. 173, 217 (1991) (Blackmun, J., dissenting). 
152. THOM FILE & CAMILLE RYAN, U.S. CENSUS BUREAU, COMPUTER AND INTERNET USE IN 
THE UNITED STATES: 2013, at 3 (2014), available at http://www.census.gov/content/dam/Census/ 
library/publications/2014/acs/acs-28.pdf.  
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would be successful. Preliminary studies on the knowledge and attitudes 
of women seeking abortion have shown that subjects had little 
knowledge about state-level abortion laws,153 and that just over half of 
women surveyed knew where to go if they needed an abortion and 
sources of financial support.154 Another study has shown that over sixty 
percent of the population harbors incorrect beliefs about the safety of 
abortion, the relationship between abortion and breast cancer, the 
relationship between abortion and mental health, and the relationship 
between having an abortion and the ability to get pregnant in the 
future.155 The proliferation of incorrect information on abortion,156 
language barriers,157 and education level158 could make it difficult if not 
impossible to correct these pre-existing misconceptions. Given these 
barriers, when faced with the choice between having her doctor provide 
childbirth services, or taking it upon herself to discover information on 
abortion and a new physician, a woman may well feel coerced into 
choosing the former. This is the exact kind of pressure that violates the 
Privacy Act. 
Second, courts should consider the nature of the state’s alternate 
facility. For example, if the facility is a standalone clinic, women may 
have a very different experience than at an integrated hospital.159 
Standalone abortion facilities are more vulnerable to violence.160 “From 
1977 to 2009, forty-one bombings and 175 arson incidents [at abortion 
clinics] were reported to the police, along with several hundred incidents 
153. Kat Cockrill & Tracy A. Weitz, Abortion Patients’ Perceptions of Abortion Regulation, 20 
WOMEN’S HEALTH ISSUES 12, 15 (2010). 
154. Lara et al., supra note 150, at *3–4. Note that this study was a “convenience” study and thus 
is not statistically representative of the population. Id. at *7. 
155. Megan L. Kavanaugh et al., Connecting Knowledge About Abortion and Sexual and 
Reproductive Health to Belief About Abortion Restrictions: Findings from an Online Survey, 23 
WOMEN’S HEALTH ISSUES e239, e242 (2013). Table 2 illustrates the responses to questions 
regarding abortion. The “starred” answers indicate correct responses. For each of the questions 
indicated, over sixty percent of respondents provided an incorrect answer. Id. 
156. For example, many states publish information on abortion which include significant 
scientific inaccuracies and false or misleading information. Cockrill & Weitz, supra note 153, at 13; 
Amy G. Bryant et al., Crisis Pregnancy Center Websites: Information, Misinformation, and 
Disinformation, 90 CONTRACEPTION 601, 603 (2014) (finding that the websites for eighty percent 
of crisis pregnancy centers listed in state-provided resource directories contained false or misleading 
information). Even if Washington does not publish those materials, they are still in the public sphere 
of information.  
157. Lara et al., supra note 150, at *5. 
158. See id. 
159. LORI FREEDMAN, WILLING AND UNABLE: DOCTORS’ CONSTRAINTS IN ABORTION CARE 20 
(1st ed. 2010). 
160. Id. 
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of burglary, stalking, bomb threats, and anthrax threats.”161 Further, 
standalone abortion facilities are regularly protested.162 Although 
citizens have a constitutional right to protest on public sidewalks163 and 
the demonstrations can be peaceful, protests can be highly disruptive.164 
From 1977 to 1995, over 6,000 abortion clinic blockades had been 
reported, resulting in confrontation and the temporary shutdown of some 
clinics.165 Although it may be possible for a clinic to obtain injunctive 
relief,166 even a short closure could be detrimental to patients’ health. 
Many women, for example, “must undergo a procedure known as 
laminaria, in which a doctor makes an insertion to expand the cervix 
several hours before the abortion.”167 Timely removal of the laminaria 
device is crucial to prevent serious infection.168 If for some reason the 
woman cannot timely reenter the clinic to have the device removed, she 
must seek medical care at a different facility to avoid infection.169 And 
even if women can enter the clinic, protesters impact the procedure 
inside the facility. The protest activities may result in patients having 
elevated blood pressure and hyperventilation.170 Under such 
circumstances, doctors may be faced with a difficult choice between 
sedating the patient, which increases the risk during a procedure, and 
chancing the patient becoming so agitated that she is unable to lie still 
during surgery.171 
Moreover, even if a clinic is not subject to protests, the mere potential 
for violence forces isolated facilities to adopt elaborate security 
measures that may negatively impact a patient’s experience.172 In some 
161. Id. at 25–26. 
162. Id. at 26. 
163. See McCullen v. Coakley, 573 U.S. ___, 134 S. Ct. 2518, 2527 (2014). 
164. See Tara K. Kelly, Note, Silencing the Lambs: Restricting the First Amendment Rights of 
Abortion Clinic Protesters in Madsen v. Women’s Health Center, 68 S. CAL. L. REV. 427, 437–38 
(1995). 
165. Id. at 438. 
166. See WASH. REV. CODE. § 7.40.020 (2014). 
167. Kelly, supra note 164, at 438; Surgical Abortion (Second Trimester), UCSF MED. CENTER, 
http://www.ucsfhealth.org/treatments/surgical_abortion_second_trimester/ (last visited Apr. 28, 
2015). 
168. Kelly, supra note 164, at 438. 
169. Id. 
170. Id. at 439. 
171. See id. 
172. Katrina Kimport et al., Analyzing the Impacts of Abortion Clinic Structures and Processes: 
A Qualitative Analysis of Women’s Negative Experience of Abortion Clinics, 85 CONTRACEPTION 
204, 207 (2011).  
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cases, patients are buzzed in and must walk through metal detectors 
when they enter.173 Some clinics only accept cash.174 Others implement 
policies requiring the separation of patients from companions, including 
partners and parents.175 These measures, though designed to protect 
patients, can make the experience feel secretive, lonely, and illicit.176 
This kind of experience perpetuates an ongoing narrative, fed by 
negative depictions of abortion clinics in popular culture, abortion 
protests,177 and legal restrictions that stigmatize abortion, especially 
when performed at clinics.178 In response, many women may choose to 
keep their abortion secret, which only continues the stigmatic culture 
surrounding abortion.179 
As a result of these experiences, women often do not return to an 
isolated facility to obtain post-abortion contraception care,180 which 
includes “the provision of information about contraception, as well as a 
contraceptive method, if requested.”181 The majority of women having a 
second or third abortion were using contraceptives at the time they 
became pregnant, suggesting that these women try hard to avoid 
pregnancy but have trouble doing so.182 Unfortunately, many standalone 
facilities are unequipped to handle anything but the abortion 
procedure.183 This is largely due to the low demand from clients who, 
because of the experience at isolated facilities, are unlikely to return for 
repeat visits.184 The result is an incomplete experience for many women 
and a perpetuation of the unwanted pregnancy problem. 
Lastly, in addition to considering the referral and nature of the state’s 
alternate facility, courts should evaluate the distance between the 
facilities. Studies have found that the farther women must travel to 
obtain an abortion, the less likely they are to have one.185 This is 
173. Id. 
174. Id. 
175. Id. at 207. 
176. Id. at 207–08. 
177. Kimport, supra note 172, at 204. 
178. Alison Norris et al., Abortion Stigma: A Reconceptualization of Constituents, Causes, and 
Consequences, 21 WOMEN’S HEALTH ISSUES S49, S50 (2011).  
179. Id. at S50. 
180. Susan A. Cohen, Repeat Abortion, Repeat Unintended Pregnancy, Repeated and Misguided 
Government Policies, 10 GUTTERMACHER POL’Y REV. 8, 11 (2007).  
181. Id. 
182. Id. at 9. 
183. Id. at 11. 
184. Id. 
185. See Stanley K. Henshaw, Factors Hindering Access to Abortion Services, 27 FAMILY 
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especially true for young and low-income women, who are 
disproportionately disadvantaged by the costs of travel, including a 
reliance on public transportation, a lack of access to child care, and 
inflexible work hours.186 However, it is difficult to define a bright-line 
rule as to when a particular distance fails to be substantially equivalent. 
Federal courts of appeals have struggled with the same issue in applying 
Casey’s undue burden standard, resulting in a variety of outcomes.187 
For example, the Fifth Circuit determined that regulations resulting in an 
increase of travel of less than 150 miles were not an undue burden.188 On 
the other hand, the Seventh Circuit upheld a preliminary injunction 
against a law that increased travel distance by up to 100 miles.189 
Whatever the result in the federal circuits, the substantially equivalent 
standard should be far more stringent than the undue burden standard, 
under which laws are invalidated if they create a substantial obstacle to a 
woman’s choice to undergo an abortion.190 Thus, when evaluating 
distance under RCW 9.02.160, courts should begin with the proposition 
that distances constituting an undue burden under Casey violate the 
Privacy Act per se, and should work backwards from there. 
Additionally, when evaluating distance, courts should take context into 
account. Given the lack of public transportation in many counties, an 
abortion facility that is fifty miles away in King County may be 
inherently different than a facility that is fifty miles away in a more rural 
county.191 Other geographical considerations may also come into play. 
In San Juan Island County, for example, the fact that patients might have 
to ferry to neighboring abortion facilities may factor into a court’s 
analysis. In other words, courts should not only examine the number of 
miles women must travel to the alternate facility, but the practical 
consequences of their personal situation and geographic location. 
PLANNING PERSPECTIVES 54, 54 (1995); James D. Shelton et al., Abortion Utilization: Does Travel 
Distance Matter?, 8 FAMILY PLANNING PERSPECTIVES 260, 262 (1976). 
186. See Planned Parenthood of Wis., Inc. v. Van Hollen, 738 F.3d 786, 796 (7th Cir. 2013); 
McCormack v. Hiedeman, 694 F.3d 1004, 1017 (9th Cir. 2012); Planned Parenthood Se., Inc. v. 
Strange, 33 F. Supp. 3d 1330, 1357 (M.D. Ala. 2014); Shelton, supra note 185, at 260. 
187. See, e.g., Women’s Med. Prof’l Corp. v. Baird, 438 F.3d 595, 604–09 (6th Cir. 2006). 
188. Planned Parenthood of Greater Tex. Surgical Health Servs. v. Abbott, 748 F.3d 583, 598 
(5th Cir. 2014). 
189. Van Hollen, 738 F.3d at 796, 799. 
190. Planned Parenthood of Se. Pa. v. Casey, 505 U.S. 833, 837 (1992) (plurality). 
191. See FED. TRANSIT ADMIN., U.S. DEP’T OF TRANSP., TRANSIT AT THE TABLE III: CASE 
STUDY WASHINGTON 1 (2011). Even though Washington has a state-funded inter-city transportation 
system, moving between cities outside of that network, or intra-county, may be difficult given the 
lack of local, county-sponsored public transit. See id. 
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These factors should not constitute an exhaustive list. Rather, they 
indicate the type of factors courts should evaluate when determining 
whether the State has met its obligation under the Act. It may, however, 
be impossible for the State to comply with these requirements. The 
private provider may refuse to give a referral to the State’s abortion 
facility. Similarly, the nearest abortion facility might be impermissibly 
far away. As will be discussed in the next section, the State’s inability to 
comply with its obligation under the Act triggers RCW 9.02.100(4). 
Courts should then subject the State’s decision to strict scrutiny.192 
B. Discrimination Under RCW 9.02.100(4) 
RCW 9.02.100(4) provides that “[t]he state shall not discriminate 
against the exercise of [the fundamental right to choose or refuse to have 
an abortion] in the regulation or provision of benefits, facilities, services, 
or information.”193 According to the Attorney General, to discriminate 
means to “make a difference in treatment or favor on a class or 
categorical basis in disregard of individual merit.”194 It is unclear, 
however, at what point a difference in treatment becomes 
discriminatory. In some doctrinal areas, like equal protection, any 
differential treatment of those similarly situated may lead to a 
violation.195 But in interpreting the Act, courts should read 
discrimination to mean a failure to provide the substantially equivalent 
abortion care outlined in RCW 9.02.160. If a court read a more stringent 
standard into discrimination—one that required the abortion and 
maternity care to be fully equivalent—it would eviscerate the 
substantially equivalent standard in RCW 9.02.160. Therefore, the State 
triggers RCW 9.02.100(4) when it fails to provide substantially 
equivalent abortion care. 
It is unclear from the plain language of the statute whether a failure to 
provide substantially equivalent care is a per se violation of the Act, or 
whether the State could, as it would in a constitutional challenge to 
abortion regulation, nonetheless justify its failure under some form of 
judicial scrutiny.196 Here, although the Act provides no explicit 
192. See infra Part II.2. 
193. WASH. REV. CODE § 9.02.100(4) (2014) (emphasis added). 
194. 2013 Attorney General Opinion, supra note 102, at 8 n.16 (internal quotation marks 
omitted). 
195. See, e.g., Nordlinger v. Hahn, 505 U.S. 1, 10 (1992). 
196. Roe v. Wade, 410 U.S. 113, 155 (1973); Planned Parenthood of Se. Pa. v. Casey, 505 U.S. 
833, 871 (1992) (plurality) (“Those cases decided that any regulation touching upon the abortion 
decision must survive strict scrutiny . . . .”); Khiara M. Bridges, “Life” in the Balance: Judicial 
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guidance, courts should again look to the Act’s history and purpose. A 
major issue directly preceding the Act’s enactment was a concern that 
the Court would overturn Roe v. Wade.197 According to the voters 
pamphlet,198 Initiative 120 sought to protect the “existing right to 
choose” that Roe recognized.199 This is significant because Roe required 
courts to evaluate regulations of abortion using strict scrutiny.200 Thus, 
the Act’s declaration of a fundamental right—which typically requires 
strict scrutiny review201—coupled with statements that the Act sought to 
codify Roe, provide strong support for the proposition that once the State 
triggers RCW 9.02.100(4) by failing to provide substantially equivalent 
abortion care, the State violates the Act unless it passes strict scrutiny. 
To be sure, under the United States Constitution, courts scrutinize 
legislation burdening the right announced in Roe under the Casey 
standard—which some have likened to both intermediate scrutiny and 
rational basis.202 But Casey came down after the Privacy Act was 
enacted, and thus, Washington voters could not have intended to be 
bound by the decision.203 And absent a showing of voter intent to the 
Review of Abortion Regulation, 46 U.C. DAVIS L. REV. 1285, 1290 (2013); Linda J. Wharton et al., 
Preserving the Core of Roe, Reflections on Planned Parenthood v. Casey, 18 YALE J.L. & FEMINISM 
317, 319 (2006); Linda J. Wharton, Roe at Thirty-Six and Beyond: Enhancing Protection for 
Abortion Rights Through State Constitutions, 15 WM. & MARY J. WOMEN & L. 469, 477–78 (2009). 
197. See WASHINGTON STATE VOTERS PAMPHLET, supra note 103, at 14; Linda J. Wharton & 
Kathryn Kolbert, Preserving Roe v. Wade . . . When You Win Only Half the Loaf, 24 STAN. L. & 
POL’Y REV. 143, 146–47 (2013) (discussing the events in 1991 that led to a fear that the Court 
would overturn Roe, including the appointment of Justice Thomas and Justice Alito’s Third Circuit 
dissenting opinion in the Casey litigation). 
198. Amalgamated Transit Union Local 587 v. State, 142 Wash. 2d 183, 205–06, 11 P.3d 762, 
780 (2000) (“However, if there is ambiguity in the enactment, the court may examine the statements 
in the voters pamphlet in order to determine the voters’ intent.”).  
199. WASHINGTON STATE VOTERS PAMPHLET, supra note 103, at 14 (emphasis added). 
200. See supra note 196.  
201. Richard H. Fallon, Jr., Strict Judicial Scrutiny, 54 UCLA L. REV. 1267, 1285 (2007); Adam 
Winkler, Fatal in Theory and Strict in Fact: An Empirical Analysis of Strict Scrutiny in the Federal 
Courts, 59 VAND. L. REV. 793, 862–63 (2006) (“Courts also use strict scrutiny to judge the 
constitutional validity of legislation infringing on fundamental rights under the Equal Protection and 
Due Process Clauses of the Fourteenth and Fifth Amendments.”). 
202. Gillian E. Metzger, Note, Unburdening the Undue Burden Standard: Orienting Casey in 
Constitutional Jurisprudence, 94 COLUM. L. REV. 2025, 2032–33 (1994); Bridges, supra note 196, 
at 1287. 
203. See Reproductive Privacy Act, 1992 Wash. Sess. Laws ch. 1, § 1, 1–3 (1992) (noting the 
Privacy Act’s effective date was December 24, 1991); Planned Parenthood of Se. Pa. v. Casey, 505 
U.S. 833, 833 (1992) (plurality) (noting the case was decided on June 29, 1992); Amalgamated 
Transit Union Local 587, 142 Wash. 2d at 205–06, 11 P.3d at 780 (“Thus, in determining the 
meaning of a statute enacted through the initiative process, the court’s purpose is to ascertain the 
collective intent of the voters who, acting in their legislative capacity, enacted the measure . . . . [I]f 
there is ambiguity in the enactment, the court may examine the statements in the voters pamphlet in 
 
                                                     
 
18 - Tanaka.docx (Do Not Delete) 6/3/2015  1:35 PM 
1018 WASHINGTON LAW REVIEW [Vol. 90:993 
contrary, the Supreme Court’s decisions following Roe are not binding 
on the interpretation of a state statute.204 Thus, applying strict scrutiny to 
the specific facts presented, if the State failed to show a compelling 
interest or that it used the least restrictive means, it would be in violation 
of RCW 9.02.100(4). If that were the case, any contracts, including 
agreements between the State and a Catholic provider, that cause the 
State to violate the Privacy Act would be void as a matter of law.205 
In sum, courts should adopt the following framework to analyze the 
State’s obligations under the Privacy Act. First, the court should inquire 
whether the State had an obligation to provide abortion care under RCW 
9.02.160. The State has an obligation to provide abortion care in two 
circumstances: when public healthcare facilities provide maternity care, 
and when private providers either accept public funding as payment for 
maternity care or contract with public providers for the joint provision of 
maternity care. When such an arrangement triggers RCW 9.02.160, the 
court should evaluate whether the provided abortion care is substantially 
equivalent. When the State provides abortion and maternity care at the 
same facility, the inquiry only requires a side-by-side comparison. If the 
State is forced to provide abortion care at a separate facility, however, 
courts should examine the practical consequences of the State’s 
provision. The relevant factors a court could analyze include: whether 
the private provider is willing to provide a referral and a minimum 
amount of information on abortion, the nature of the abortion facility, 
and the distance between the facilities. If the State is unable to meet its 
obligation under RCW 9.02.160, it triggers RCW 9.02.100(4), which 
forbids the State from discriminating against the fundamental right of 
choice. Once the State triggers RCW 9.02.100(4), it discriminates, 
within the meaning of the provision, if the failure to provide 
substantially equivalent abortion care does not pass strict scrutiny. Thus, 
regardless of whether the facility providing maternity care is public or 
private, or if the State provides the maternity care directly or by contract, 
the State cannot enter into an arrangement that causes it to violate the 
order to determine the voters’ intent.”). 
204. See State v. Gore, 101 Wash. 2d 481, 487, 681 P.2d 227, 231 (1984) (“While the Supreme 
Court’s interpretation of a similar federal statute is persuasive authority, it is not controlling in our 
interpretation of a state statute.”). 
205. Failor’s Pharm. v. Dep’t of Soc. & Health Servs., 125 Wash. 2d 488, 499, 886 P.2d 147, 153 
(1994) (“A contract in conflict with statutory requirements is illegal and unenforceable as a matter 
of law . . . . Even where a contract is within an agency’s substantive authority, failure to comply 
with statutorily mandated procedures is ultra vires and renders the contract void.”); Pierce Cnty. v. 
State, 144 Wash. App. 783, 841, 185 P.3d 594, 624 (Wash. Ct. App. 2008) (“A contract that 
conflicts with statutory requirements is illegal and unenforceable as a matter of law.”). 
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Act. If it does, the agreement is void as a matter of law. 
III. THE REPRODUCTIVE PRIVACY ACT AND THE FREE 
EXERCISE OF RELIGION 
Catholic healthcare providers in Washington may challenge the 
Reproductive Privacy Act on free exercise grounds. Applying the 
framework the previous section outlined, if a private provider chose to 
accept state funds for maternity care, it would have to accommodate the 
state by providing a referral and a minimal amount of information on 
abortion.206 This is not to downplay the moral dilemma an abortion 
referral could create for objecting providers. Many pro-life proponents 
are opposed to referral because it makes physicians complicit in the 
performance of acts that they find morally objectionable.207 Accordingly, 
this Comment analyzes the arguments of two potential plaintiffs: 
healthcare providers and doctors. It assumes that the private provider 
chose to accept the State’s terms by providing a referral and a minimum 
amount of abortion information. Those plaintiffs may challenge the Act 
under the First Amendment to the Constitution208 or Article I section XI 
of the Washington Constitution.209 
A. The First Amendment Is Not an Attractive Option for Plaintiffs 
The First Amendment provides a highly deferential standard of 
review for neutral and generally applicable laws burdening the free 
exercise of religion. As such, it is an unattractive cause of action for 
those looking to challenge the Reproductive Privacy Act. Prior to 1990, 
the Court usually applied strict scrutiny, outlined in Sherbert v. 
Verner,210 when evaluating a law on free exercise grounds.211 Under the 
Sherbert test, the Court initially considered whether the plaintiff’s claim 
206. See infra Part II. 
207. See MARK R. WICCLAIR, CONSCIENTIOUS OBJECTION IN HEALTH CARE: AN ETHICAL 
ANALYSIS 38 (2011); Carolyn McLeod, Referral in the Wake of Conscientious Objection to 
Abortion, 23 HYPATIA 30, 30 (2008). 
208. U.S. CONST. amend. I. 
209. WASH. CONST. art. I, § XI. Note that plaintiffs could not challenge the Privacy Act under 
RFRA— which applies only to the federal government. See City of Boerne v. Flores, 521 U.S. 507, 
536 (1997). 
210. 374 U.S. 398 (1963). 
211. See id.; Wisconsin v. Yoder, 406 U.S. 205, 215–16 (1972). Note that the strict scrutiny 
employed by the Court in the free exercises cases is more of a weighted balancing test. Fallon, Jr., 
supra note 201, at 1306. This is different than the form of strict scrutiny employed in other areas, 
such as race discrimination. Id. at 1308. 
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was rooted in “religious belief.”212 If so, the Court considered whether 
the law had a sufficiently coercive effect on religion to trigger First 
Amendment protection.213 If the law expressly prohibited religious 
practice or forced the plaintiff to choose between violating the law or her 
religion, the Court considered it coercive.214 If the law was coercive, it 
triggered the First Amendment and had to pass strict scrutiny.215 
Applying strict scrutiny, the Court would ask whether the law directly 
advanced a compelling state interest and utilized the least restrictive 
means.216 
In the years leading up to the Court’s decision in Employment 
Division Department of Human Resources of Oregon v. Smith,217 the 
Sherbert test began to lose favor with the Court.218 Finally, in Smith, the 
Court limited Sherbert strict scrutiny to laws regulating the receipt of 
unemployment benefits, laws burdening “hybrid rights,” or those 
implicating free exercise interests in conjunction with other 
constitutional protections, and those laws that directly discriminate 
against religion.219 The import of the Smith decision was that laws with a 
coercive effect on religion, though sufficient to trigger heightened 
scrutiny under Sherbert, need only survive deferential scrutiny as long as 
212. See Yoder, 406 U.S. at 216; Sherbert, 374 U.S. at 403. Thus, Thoreau’s choice to reject 
social values and isolate himself on Walden Pond would not give rise to a free exercise claim 
because his decision was personal rather than religious. Yoder, 406 U.S. at 216. 
213. See Lying v. Nw. Indian Cemetery Protective Ass’n, 485 U.S. 439, 449 (1988). 
214. Id.  
215. Id. at 450–51.  
216. Sherbert, 374 U.S. at 406–07. After the Court’s decision in Burwell v. Hobby Lobby, No. 13-
34 (U.S. 2014), there is a dispute amongst the Justices about whether the Sherbert test included a 
least restrictive means component. Justice Alito’s majority opinion pointed to post-Smith decisions 
interpreting the Sherbert line as not requiring that the government use the least restrictive means. Id. 
slip op. at 6 n.3. In dissent, however, Justice Ginsburg argued that those decisions incorrectly read 
the least restrictive means requirement out of the Sherbert test. Id. slip op. at 12 (Ginsburg, J., 
dissenting). Although the majority opinion came close to holding that Sherbert does not have a least 
restrictive means component, it elected not to definitively answer that question. Id. slip op. at 17 
n.18 (majority opinion). Despite the dispute, this Comment assumes that the Sherbert test includes a 
least restrictive means component because that understanding aligns with the Washington Supreme 
Court’s Sherbert interpretation. See First Covenant Church of Seattle v. City of Seattle, 120 Wash. 
2d 203, 218–19, 840 P.2d 174, 183 (1992). 
217. 494 U.S. 872 (1990). 
218. Id. at 883 (noting that the Court declined to apply the Sherbert test in the cases immediately 
preceding Smith). 
219. Id. at 872, 879, 881, 883. The Court does not always find a facially neutral law to be neutral 
in fact. For example, in Church of the Lukumi Babalu Aye, Inc. v. City of Hialeah, the Court applied 
strict scrutiny to a law that banned animal sacrifice. 508 U.S. 520, 533–34 (1993). Though the law 
did not expressly target religion, the Court found that in enacting the law, city officials targeted the 
Santeria religion. Id. 
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the law did not burden a “hybrid right”220 or “discriminate” against 
religion.221 Declining to breathe life into the already diminishing 
Sherbert test, Smith narrowed the potential applications of heightened 
scrutiny when evaluating laws on free exercise grounds. After Smith, to 
invoke strict scrutiny, plaintiffs must prove that the law discriminates 
against religion222 or burdens a “hybrid right.”223 Applying the Smith 
framework to a Catholic provider or doctor’s free exercise challenge, 
this Comment argues that the Privacy Act neither discriminates against 
religion nor burdens another constitutional right. Accordingly, plaintiffs 
would only be entitled to deferential scrutiny in a federal free exercise 
claim. 
1. The Reproductive Privacy Act Does Not Discriminate Against 
Religion 
There is no indication that the Reproductive Privacy Act 
discriminates, facially or otherwise, against religion. A law discriminates 
against religion if “the object of [the] law is to infringe upon or restrict 
practices because of their religious motivation.”224 There are, however, 
“many ways of demonstrating that the object or purpose of a law is the 
suppression of religion or religious conduct.”225 The first indicium of a 
law’s purpose is its text.226 “A law [is facially discriminatory] if it refers 
to a religious practice without a secular meaning discernable from the 
language or context.”227 
The Reproductive Privacy Act is facially neutral. The law makes no 
reference to any religious practice. Although the law refers to the 
performance of “abortion”—which could violate religious practices—the 
use of “abortion” within the Act has secular meaning.228 The Act refers 
to the performance of abortion universally, not just in the context of 
220. See Adam Schwartzbaum, Comment, The Niqab in the Courtroom: Protecting Free Exercise 
of Religion in a Post-Smith World, 159 U. PA. L. REV. 1533, 1545 (2011). 
221. Noel E. Horton, Comment, Article I, Section 11: A Poor “Plan B” for Washington’s 
Religious Pharmacists, 85 WASH. L. REV. 739, 744 n.41 (2010).  
222. Church of the Lukumi Babalu Aye, 508 U.S. at 533. 
223. Smith, 494 U.S. at 881–82. 
224. Id. 
225. Id.  
226. Id. 
227. Id. 
228. See WASH. REV. CODE § 9.02.160 (2014) (referencing services to voluntarily terminate 
one’s pregnancy); id. §§ 9.02.150, 9.02.160, 9.02.100(2). 
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religious practice.229 Accordingly the Act is not facially discriminatory. 
However, “[f]acial neutrality is not determinative.”230 A law may 
discriminate against religion despite textual neutrality.231 A court may 
look at the history or operation of the law to find evidence of animus 
towards religion.232 Adverse impact on religion, however, will not 
always lead to a finding of impermissible discrimination.233 The law’s 
object may be social harms that are legitimate governmental concerns.234 
For example, in Locke v. Davey235 the Court determined that Washington 
State’s refusal to allow a student to use a state-sponsored scholarship to 
pursue a college degree in theology did not discriminate against 
religion.236 Because the State had a legitimate antiestablishment interest, 
the Washington State Legislature did not intend to single out religious 
practice for discriminatory treatment.237 This distinguished Davey from 
Church of the Lukumi Babalu Aye, Inc. v. City of Hialeah,238 in which 
the City of Hialeah utilized the force of criminal law to suppress 
ritualistic animal sacrifices of the Santeria religion.239 Unlike 
Washington State, the City of Hialeah used the law to accomplish a 
“religious gerrymander,” by singling out the Santeria religion and its 
religious practices.240 
The Reproductive Privacy Act is more like the Washington law in 
Davey than the City of Hialeah’s ordinance. The Act does not impose 
criminal sanctions.241 It does not target a particular religion, but applies 
uniformly to all healthcare providers. Most importantly, as discussed 
229. Id. 
230. Church of the Lukumi Babalu Aye, Inc. v. City of Hialeah, 508 U.S. 520, 534 (1993). 
231. See id. 
232. See Locke v. Davey, 540 U.S. 712, 724 (2004) (“In short, we find neither in the 
history . . . nor in the operation of [the law], anything that suggests animus towards religion.”). 
233. Church of the Lukumi Babalu Aye, 508 U.S. at 535. 
234. Id. 
235. 540 U.S. 712. 
236. Id. at 724–25. 
237. Id. at 721–22. 
238. 508 U.S. 520. 
239. Davey, 540 U.S. at 720 (citing Church of the Lukumi Babalu Aye, 508 U.S. at 535). 
240. See Church of the Lukumi Babalu Aye, 508 U.S. at 535. The Court determined that the 
ordinances excluded “almost all killings of animals except for religious sacrifice, 
and . . . narrow[ed] the proscribed category even further, in particular by exempting kosher 
slaughter.” Id. at 536. “The net result of the gerrymander [was] that few if any killings of animals 
[were] prohibited other than Santeria sacrifice . . . .” Id. Further, such practices were proscribed only 
because they occurred during a religious ceremony. Id.   
241. Cf. Davey, 540 U.S. at 720 (noting that unlike the Hialeah ordinance, the scholarship did not 
impose criminal sanctions). 
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later, the Act pursues legitimate government interests in protecting the 
health and safety of pregnant women and ensuring the efficacy of a 
woman’s right of choice.242 It is therefore apparent, from both the text 
and operation of the Act, that Washington voters did not intend to single 
out religious groups for discriminatory reasons, but rather, intended to 
pursue other goals resulting in an incidental burden on religious 
practice.243 
2. The Reproductive Privacy Act Does Not Burden a “Hybrid” Right 
The second way plaintiffs may escape deferential scrutiny under 
Smith is if they can show that the law burdens free exercise “in 
conjunction with other constitutional protections, such as freedom of 
speech and of the press.”244 This “hybrid rights” doctrine has been the 
source of substantial criticism because, as Justice Souter noted, if 
plaintiffs could bootstrap other constitutional claims to their free 
exercise claim, the hybrid right exemption would swallow the deferential 
Smith rule.245 As such, some circuits treat the hybrid rights doctrine as 
unworkable dicta and ignore hybrid claims.246 The Ninth Circuit requires 
plaintiffs asserting the hybrid rights doctrine to make out a “colorable 
claim that a companion right has been violated—that is, a fair 
probability or a likelihood, but not a certitude, of success on the 
merits.”247 If the plaintiff succeeds in establishing a colorable claim, she 
would be entitled to strict scrutiny.248 But recently, the Ninth Circuit 
242. See infra Part IV.B. 
243. The Western District of Washington’s decision in Stormans Inc. v. Selecky, 844 F. Supp. 2d 
1172, 1176 (W.D. Wash. 2012), is inapposite. In Stormans, the court evaluated, on free exercise 
grounds, a rule that required pharmacies to stock and deliver birth control. Id. Analyzing the rule 
under Lukumi, the court determined that the rule was not neutral because it was riddled with secular 
exemptions, but made no such accommodation for religion. Id. at 1190–91. Further, the court found 
that the State had adopted a general air of non-enforcement except when it came to Stormans. Id. at 
1194. Unlike Stormans, however, the Reproductive Privacy Act does not contain secular 
exemptions. In fact, the only exemption is for religion. WASH. REV. CODE § 9.02.150 (2014). 
Moreover, there is no indication that the Act has been enforced in a discriminatory fashion.  
244. Emp’t Div., Dep’t of Human Res. of Or. v. Smith, 494 U.S. 872, 881 (1990); Schwartzbaum, 
supra note 220, at 1547. 
245. Church of the Lukumi Babalu Aye, 508 U.S. at 567 (Souter, J., concurring). Indeed, the 
exemption would seemingly cover the scenario in Smith because the peyote ritual also implicated 
free speech and associational rights. Id.   
246. Note, The Best of a Bad Lot: Compromise and Hybrid Religious Exemptions, 123 HARV. L. 
REV. 1494, 1498–99 (2010). 
247. Miller v. Reed, 176 F.3d 1202, 1207 (9th Cir. 1999) (citation omitted) (internal quotation 
marks omitted). 
248. Id. at 1207–08. 
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noted that no court had ever allowed a plaintiff to succeed on a hybrid 
rights claim and declined to be the first.249 Thus, it is unclear whether the 
hybrid rights doctrine is good law in the Ninth Circuit. Nevertheless, this 
Comment assumes for the sake of argument that the Ninth Circuit still 
follows the hybrid rights doctrine. Healthcare providers and doctors 
subject to the Act may argue that it burdens their freedom of speech in 
addition to free exercise, triggering the hybrid rights doctrine. If, 
however, the Ninth Circuit no longer recognizes hybrid rights, the 
following will serve as an independent analysis of a potential plaintiff’s 
free speech claim. 
a. Healthcare Providers 
A Catholic healthcare provider could argue that the requirement that it 
facilitate the state’s provision of abortion services and counseling at its 
facility burdens free speech as well as free exercise. A court could find 
that a hospital’s provision of Catholic, anti-abortion health services is a 
form of protected speech.250 RCW 9.02.160 arguably burdens that 
speech by conditioning the use of government funds on engaging in a 
type of speech the government mandates. In other words, if a Catholic 
provider wished to engage in the provision of healthcare that only 
promoted a Catholic message, it could not use government funds for 
maternity care. 
The government cannot, consistent with the First Amendment, 
“penalize” the exercise of free speech by denying government benefits; 
and the “government may not coerce people into relinquishing [speech] 
rights through regulation, spending, and licensing.”251 It is 
unconstitutional, for example, for the government to declare that 
property tax exemptions will only be available to those veterans who 
declare that they will not advocate the forcible overthrow of the 
government.252 To deny the exemption “to claimants who engage in 
certain forms of speech is in effect to penalize them for such speech.”253 
249. Jacobs v. Clark Cnty. Sch. Dist., 526 F.3d 419, 440 & n.45 (9th Cir. 2008). 
250. Cf. Hurley v. Irish-Am. Gay, Lesbian & Bisexual Grp. of Bos., 515 U.S. 557, 569 (1995) 
(holding that the message of a parade was protected expression because “[s]ymbolism is a primitive 
but effective way of communicating ideas” (quoting W. Va. State Bd. of Educ. v. Barnette, 319 U.S. 
624, 632 (1943) (modifications in original)). The argument here is that the provision of healthcare in 
accordance with the Catholic mission is a form of symbolic speech. 
251. Cass R. Sunstein, Why the Unconstitutional Conditions Doctrine Is an Anachronism (with 
Particular Reference to Religion, Speech, and Abortion), 70 B.U. L. REV. 593, 601 (1990). 
252. Speiser v. Randall, 357 U.S. 513, 518 (1958). 
253. Id.  
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On the other hand, the government may constitutionally choose not to 
fund certain activities. In Rust v. Sullivan,254 the Court upheld a Health 
and Human Services regulation forbidding projects that were receiving 
federal family planning funds under Title X of the Public Health Service 
Act from counseling or referring women for abortion and from 
encouraging, promoting, or advocating abortion.255 The Court held that 
the regulation was not an unconstitutional penalty, but rather a 
permissible decision to “selectively fund a program to encourage certain 
activities it believes to be in the public interest, without at the same time 
funding an alternative program . . . .”256 
The distinction between a subsidy that impermissibly penalizes 
speakers for engaging in certain speech and the government’s 
constitutional choice to fund certain kinds of speech to the exclusion of 
others is blurred at best. The critical inquiry is whether “the Government 
has placed a condition on the recipient of the subsidy rather than on a 
particular program or service, thus effectively prohibiting the recipient 
from engaging in the protected conduct outside the scope of the federally 
funded program.”257 In other words, if the speaker must relinquish its 
speech due to an inability to segregate its activities based on the source 
of its funding, the law is an unconstitutional burden on speech.258 This 
distinction, in part, saved the Title X funding restrictions in Rust from 
constitutional infirmity.259 The Title X funding recipients were not 
forced to relinquish any speech right.260 Because the restriction pertained 
only to Title X projects, rather than Title X grantees, funding recipients 
could engage in abortion-related speech as long as it was separate and 
254. 500 U.S. 173 (1991). 
255. Id. at 179–81, 203. 
256. Id. at 193. 
257. Id. at 197 (emphasis omitted). 
258. FCC v. League of Women Voters of Cal., 468 U.S. 364, 400 (1984). Compare, for example, 
FCC v. League of Women Voters with Regan v. Taxation with Representation of Wash., 461 U.S. 
540 (1983). In League of Women Voters, the Court struck down a provision of the Public 
Broadcasting Act requiring that any public broadcasting station receiving a federal grant from the 
Corporation for Public Broadcasting refrain from editorializing. 468 U.S. at 366, 402. Because 
public broadcast corporations could not create an affiliate corporation, which could then use the 
parent station’s facilities to engage in editorializing, the stations were unconstitutionally forced to 
choose between engaging in protected speech and losing the funds. Id. at 400. The Court 
distinguished Taxation with Representation, in which the Court upheld a provision of the Internal 
Revenue Code barring non-profit organizations engaged in lobbying from receiving tax deductible 
contributions, because the non-profits in Regan could, by operation of law, lobby through an 
affiliate organization while still receiving tax deductible contributions. Id.  
259. See Rust, 500 U.S. at 196. 
260. Id. 
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distinct from the Title X funds.261 By contrast, the ability to segregate 
funds was not available to the plaintiffs in Speiser v. Randall,262 as the 
funding condition was placed on veterans themselves.263 Therefore, the 
condition forced veterans to choose between exercising their free speech 
rights and receiving the tax exemption.264 
The funding restriction in RCW 9.02.160 operates in the same way as 
the Title X restriction in Rust. The law does not force hospitals to choose 
between providing anti-abortion health services and using state money 
for maternity care.265 To the contrary, hospitals remain free to provide 
anti-abortion maternity care while receiving state funding.266 Although 
the law potentially forces hospitals to engage in speech they disagree 
with, the same was true in Rust. Pro-abortion hospitals receiving Title X 
funding were required to tell patients that the project “d[id] not consider 
abortion an appropriate method of family planning.”267 As long as the 
speaker still has the option of engaging in their speech, advocating a 
government message contrary to the speaker’s position does not violate 
the Constitution.268 Further, Washington hospitals are in no way required 
to accept the state funds for maternity care.269 “[T]o avoid the force of 
the regulations, [hospitals] can simply decline the subsidy.”270 The Court 
has never held that the government violates the First Amendment by 
261. Id. 
262. 357 U.S. 513 (1958). 
263. Id. at 518–19. 
264. Id.  
265. See generally WASH. REV. CODE § 9.02.160 (2014) (providing only that the State shall 
provide abortion care when it provides maternity care). 
266. See id. 
267. Rust v. Sullivan, 500 U.S. 173, 180 (1991) (“The Title X project is expressly prohibited 
from referring a pregnant woman to an abortion provider, even upon specific request. One 
permissible response to such an inquiry is that the project does not consider abortion an appropriate 
method of family planning and therefore does not counsel or refer for abortion.” (internal quotation 
marks omitted)). 
268. Legal Servs. Corp. v. Velazquez, 531 U.S. 533, 541–42 (2001) (“The Court in Rust did not 
place explicit reliance on the rationale that the counseling activities of the doctors under Title X 
amounted to governmental speech; when interpreting the holding in later cases, however, we have 
explained Rust on this understanding. We have said that viewpoint-based funding decisions can be 
sustained in instances in which the government is itself the speaker, or instances, like Rust, in which 
the government ‘used private speakers to transmit specific information pertaining to its own 
program.’” (citations omitted) (quoting Rosenberger v. Rector & Visitors of Univ. of Va., 515 U.S. 
819, 833 (1995))). 
269. See UNDERPAYMENT BY MEDICARE AND MEDICAID FACT SHEET, AM. HOSPITAL ASS’N 1 
(Dec. 2010) (“Hospital participation in Medicare and Medicaid is voluntary.”); 2013 Attorney 
General Opinion, supra note 102, at 8. 
270. Rust, 500 U.S. at 199 n.5. 
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offering hospitals the choice between accepting the funds subject to the 
government’s conditions or declining the subsidy and offering their own 
unsubsidized program.271 Accordingly, if Catholic providers wish to 
challenge the Act under the United States Constitution, a court will 
subject the Act to the deferential Smith standard of review because the 
Privacy Act does not unconstitutionally burden a hospital’s right of free 
speech. 
b. Doctors 
In addition to Catholic providers, doctors at a hospital may argue that 
the Act unconstitutionally compels speech through the referral and 
information requirement. To be sure, the Act compels professional 
speech—that is “speech . . . uttered in the course of professional 
practice.”272 The distinction between professional and private speech is 
essential. In the context of private speech, we hope to spark a robust 
debate.273 We assume censorship of speech because of its message is 
unconstitutional.274 In the realm of professional speech, however, we 
insist on competence, not debate, resulting in permissible regulation.275 
In fact, the government and medical associations often prescribe what 
doctors can and cannot say to their patients.276 Courts have repeatedly 
upheld such requirements.277 Indeed, as Dean Robert Post remarked, 
271. Id.  
272. See Robert Post, Informed Consent to Abortion: A First Amendment Analysis of Compelled 
Physician Speech, 2007 U. ILL L. REV. 939, 947 (2007). 
273. N.Y. Times Co. v. Sullivan, 376 U.S. 254, 269 (1964). 
274. Post, supra note 272, at 949–50. 
275. Id. at 950. 
276. Lauren R. Robbins, Comment, Open Your Mouth and Say “Ideology”: Physicians and the 
First Amendment, 12 U. PA. J. CONST. L. 155, 165; see also, e.g., Lowe v. SEC, 472 U.S. 181, 228 
(1985) (White, J., concurring) (“The power of government to regulate the professions is not lost 
whenever the practice of a profession entails speech.”). 
277. See, e.g., Gonzales v. Carhart, 550 U.S. 124, 159 (2007) (“The State has an interest in 
ensuring so grave a choice is well informed.”); Planned Parenthood of Se. Pa. v. Casey, 505 U.S. 
833, 882 (1992) (“We also see no reason why the State may not require doctors to inform a woman 
seeking an abortion of the availability of materials relating to the consequences to the fetus, even 
when those consequences have no direct relation to her health.”); Tex. Med. Providers Performing 
Abortion Servs. v. Lakey, 667 F.3d 570, 573, 579–80 (5th Cir. 2012) (upholding Texas statute 
requiring physicians performing an abortion to display a sonogram of fetus, make audible the 
heartbeat, and explain the results of the procedure); Comprehensive Health of Planned Parenthood 
of Kan. & Mid-Mo., Inc. v. Templeton, 954 F. Supp. 2d 1205, 1212, 1216–17 (D. Kan. 2013) 
(denying Plaintiff’s motion for preliminary injunction to bar enforcement of Kansas statute 
requiring physicians to inform patients that the unborn child can feel pain); Eubanks v. Schmidt, 
126 F. Supp. 2d 451, 452–53 (W.D. Ky. 2000) (holding it was constitutional for the state to require 
abortion providers to provide a woman with informed consent materials that favor childbirth over 
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“The history and importance of mandated medical disclosures is so 
entrenched that it cannot be called into constitutional question.”278 
Nevertheless, physician speech is entitled to some First Amendment 
protection. Generally, the government cannot force physicians to engage 
in ideological speech,279 or speech that expresses a particular point of 
view on matters of opinion, like politics, religion, or morality.280 There 
is currently disagreement amongst the circuits as to the point at which 
physicians cease to give relevant medical information and instead 
promote the State’s view on the morality of abortion.281 In evaluating the 
Privacy Act, however, it is unnecessary to resolve that debate because, 
again, Rust controls. In that case, doctors also challenged the funding 
restrictions as a violation of their free speech.282 In denying their 
challenge, the Court held that “[t]he employees’ freedom of expression 
[was] limited during the time that they actually work for the project; but 
this limitation [was] a consequence of their decision to accept 
employment in a project, the scope of which is permissibly restricted by 
the funding authority.”283 This is critically different than challenges to 
laws that mandate that all physicians within their jurisdiction make 
certain disclosures, regardless of whether government funds are 
present.284 Further, the Court acknowledged the argument that 
“traditional relationships such as that between doctor and patient should 
enjoy protection under the First Amendment from Government 
regulation, even when subsidized by the Government.”285 It was 
unnecessary, however, to resolve that argument because “the Title X 
program regulations [did] not significantly impinge upon the doctor-
patient relationship. Nothing in them require[d] a doctor to represent as 
abortion despite freedom of speech challenges by providers). 
278. Post, supra note 272, at 981. 
279. See Wooley v. Manyard, 430 U.S. 705, 717 (1977); Jennifer M. Keighley, Physician Speech 
and Mandatory Ultrasound Laws: The First Amendment’s Limit on Compelled Ideological Speech, 
34 CARDOZO L. REV. 2347, 2378 (2013). 
280. Wooley, 430 U.S. at 715; Keighley, supra note 279, at 2364. 
281. See, e.g., Stuart v. Camnitz, 774 F.3d 238, 242 (4th Cir. 2014) (holding that a North Carolina 
statute that required physicians to display a sonogram and describe the fetus to women seeking 
abortions unconstitutionally compelled speech); Lakey, 667 F.3d at 579–80 (finding that a Texas 
statute requiring a physician performing an abortion to perform and display a sonogram of the fetus, 
make audible the heartbeat for the woman to hear, and to explain to the pregnant mother the results 
of the procedure did not violate the First Amendment because the requirements were nothing but 
truthful medical information that was pertinent to a woman’s decision). 
282. Rust v. Sullivan, 500 U.S. 173, 192 (1991). 
283. Id. at 198–99. 
284. See cases cited supra note 277. 
285. Rust, 500 U.S. at 200. 
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his own any opinion that he does not in fact hold.”286 The same is true of 
the Privacy Act. It does not require physicians to represent an opinion 
nor does it impinge on their ability to provide alternate advice. It merely 
requires that a physician provide a referral and certain information on 
abortion that is a result of the physician accepting employment at a 
healthcare facility that uses government funds for maternity care.287 
Accordingly, neither doctors nor providers can successfully argue that 
the Act burdens their free speech. To the extent that the Ninth Circuit 
recognizes the hybrid rights doctrine, courts will subject the Act to 
deferential Smith scrutiny if challenged on federal grounds.288 Given the 
choice between the deferential Smith standard or the Washington 
Constitution’s strict scrutiny standard, plaintiffs will almost certainly 
choose the latter. Accordingly, this Comment analyzes a free exercise 
challenge to the Act under the Washington Constitution. 
IV. THE REPRODUCTIVE PRIVACY ACT PASSES STRICT 
SCRUTINY UNDER THE WASHINGTON CONSTITUTION 
The First Amendment provides the “floor” of free exercise rights, 
leaving states to enact more protective measures.289 The Washington 
Constitution declares: 
Absolute freedom of conscience in all matters of religious 
sentiment, belief and worship, shall be guaranteed to every 
individual, and no one shall be molested or disturbed in person 
or property on account of religion; but the liberty of conscious 
hereby secured shall not be so construed as to excuse acts of 
licentiousness or justify practices inconsistent with the peace 
and safety of the state.290 
Washington courts claim to interpret the Washington Constitution as 
providing more free exercise protection than the United States 
Constitution.291 They employ the Sherbert test, regardless of whether the 
law is neutral, and frequently look to federal cases for interpretative 
guidance.292 Courts applying Sherbert must engage in a three-part 
286. Id.  
287. See supra Part II. 
288. See supra Part III. 
289. Horton, supra note 221, at 754. 
290. WASH. CONST. art. I, § 11. 
291. First Covenant Church of Seattle v. City of Seattle, 120 Wash. 2d 203, 223–26, 840 P.2d 
174, 185–87 (1992). 
292. See id. at 226–27, 840 P.2d at 187; Open Door Baptist Church v. Clark Cnty., 140 Wash. 2d 
143, 161, 995 P.2d 33, 43 (2000) (“As we have done in all other Const. art. I, § 11 cases, we can 
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analysis. First, they must determine whether the law has a coercive 
effect on religious exercise. If the court finds a coercive effect, it must 
determine whether the law furthers a compelling government interest. 
Finally, if the law furthers a compelling interest, it must employ the least 
restrictive means to further that interest. 
A. The Reproductive Privacy Act May Have a Coercive Effect on 
Doctors but Not Providers 
As a threshold matter, the complaining party must first prove that the 
law has a coercive effect on religious exercise.293 To demonstrate 
coercive effect, the plaintiff must show both a sincerely held religious 
belief and that the government action burdens that belief.294 Although 
the threshold burden for coercive effect is ill-defined, the Washington 
State Supreme Court stated that “a burden can be a slight inconvenience 
without violating article I, section 11, but the State cannot impose 
substantial burden on exercise of religion.”295 A substantial burden is 
one that somehow compels or pressures the individual to violate a tenet 
of his faith.296 
The Act does not substantially burden the free exercise of Catholic 
providers, who may argue that the Act forces them to choose between 
accepting government funds subject to the State’s conditions, and their 
statutory right and religious obligation to refuse to participate in the 
performance of an abortion.297 Although the Washington State Supreme 
Court recognized the coercive effect of a monetary burden when it 
diminishes the value of church assets,298 it has held that a law does not 
also look to the reasoning of opinions construing the Free Exercise Clause of the First Amendment 
for persuasive guidance.”); Katie Hosford, Comment, The Search for a Distinct Religious-Liberty 
Jurisprudence Under the Washington State Constitution, 75 WASH. L. REV. 643, 655 (2000) (“[T]he 
court’s current test is virtually identical to the federal strict scrutiny test under Sherbert.”). 
293. First United Methodist Church of Seattle v. Hearing Exam’r for the Seattle Landmarks Pres. 
Bd., 129 Wash. 2d 238, 246, 916 P.2d 374, 378 (1996). 
294. Horton, supra note 221, at 766. 
295. City of Woodinville v. Northshore United Church of Christ, 166 Wash. 2d 633, 645, 211 
P.3d 406, 411 (2009). 
296. State v. Motherwell, 114 Wash. 2d 353, 361, 788 P.2d 1066, 1070 (1990). 
297. WASH. REV. CODE § 9.02.150 (2014). 
298. First United Methodist Church of Seattle, 129 Wash. 2d at 249, 916 P.2d at 380 (“While not 
all financial burdens have a coercive effect on the practice of religion, gross financial burdens 
violate the right to free exercise. ‘Designation of First Covenant’s church so grossly diminishes the 
value of the Church’s principal asset that it impermissibly burdens First Covenant’s right to free 
exercise of religion.’” (citations omitted) (quoting First Covenant Church of Seattle v. City of 
Seattle, 120 Wash. 2d 203, 220, 849 P.2d 174, 183–84 (1992))).  
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impose a substantial burden when the government refuses to provide 
financial assistance for individuals to better exercise their religious 
beliefs.299 The difference being that, in the first instance, the law acts as 
a prior restraint300 to the practice of religion.301 In the second, the 
claimant’s own financial trouble creates the burden, rather than the 
government.302 In other words, as in Rust, when the government merely 
withholds funds, it does not actually place an obstacle in the individual’s 
path, and thus does not create a coercive effect.303 To be sure, in 
applying Sherbert to the denial of unemployment benefits, the U.S. 
Supreme Court held that “[w]here the state conditions receipt of an 
important benefit upon conduct proscribed by a religious faith . . . a 
burden on religion exists.”304 But the Court has typically limited this 
reasoning to the unemployment benefit context where the importance of 
the benefit makes the pressure to forego a particular practice 
unmistakable.305 In the instance of government support for the provision 
of healthcare, the Act simply does not place that kind of pressure on 
Catholic providers. The Act does not function as a kind of prior restraint, 
nor does the importance of funding rise to the level of unemployment 
benefits. Unwilling providers can avoid triggering the Act by 
segregating their funds so that no state money is used for maternity care. 
299.  Witters v. State Comm’n for the Blind, 112 Wash. 2d 363, 372, 771 P.2d 1119, 1123 (1989) 
(“In the present case, the Commission’s denial of vocational aid to the [applicant] did not compel or 
pressure him to violate his religious beliefs. . . . The Commission’s decision may make it financially 
difficult, or even impossible, for [applicant] to become a minister, but this is beyond the scope of 
the free exercise clause.” (quoting Witters v. State Comm’n for the Blind, 102 Wash. 2d 624, 631, 
689 P.2d 53, 57 (1984)); see also Sherbert v. Verner, 374 U.S. 398, 412 (1963) (Douglas, J., 
concurring) (“The fact that government cannot exact from me a surrender of one iota of my 
religious scruples does not, of course, mean that I can demand of government a sum of money, the 
better to exercise them.”). 
300. A prior restraint is a “governmental restriction on speech or publication before its actual 
expression.” BLACK’S LAW DICTIONARY 1232 (8th ed. 2007). 
301. Open Door Baptist Church v. Clark Cnty., 140 Wash. 2d 143, 181–82, 995 P.2d 33, 53 
(2000) (“Prior restraint on religious exercise has been highly suspect at least since the time the 
United States Supreme Court told municipalities over half a century ago they could not require 
religious colporteurs to pay a license tax as a condition to the pursuit of their activities, even if the 
license ordinance were facially nondiscriminatory.”). 
302. Bob Jones Univ. v. United States, 461 U.S. 574, 603–04 (1983) (“Denial of tax benefits will 
inevitably have a substantial impact on the operation of private religious schools, but will not 
prevent those schools from observing their religious tenets.”); Witters, 112 Wash. 2d at 371–72, 771 
P.2d at 1123. 
303. See Rust v. Sullivan, 500 U.S. 173, 201–02 (1991).  
304. Hobbie v. Unemployment Appeals Comm’n of Fla., 480 U.S. 136, 141 (1987) (citing 
Thomas v. Review Bd. of Ind. Emp’t Sec. Div., 450 U.S. 707, 717–18 (1981)). 
305. See Hobbie, 480 U.S. at 139–40; Thomas, 450 U.S. at 717–18; Sherbert v. Verner, 374 U.S. 
398, 404 (1963). 
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This does not impair their ability to receive government assistance to 
fund the rest of their operation. Although the inability to use government 
funds for maternity care is a slight inconvenience, it is not a substantial 
burden. 
Unwilling doctors, on the other hand, may have a legitimate claim 
that the Act substantially burdens their exercise of religion. To illustrate, 
consider the previous Part’s hypothetical: A public hospital district and a 
Catholic healthcare provider contract for the construction and operation 
of a new healthcare facility that will provide a full range of maternity 
care. Under the terms of the agreement, the public hospital district will 
contribute over ninety percent of the funding for the project, but the 
Catholic provider will retain ultimate ownership and control. Although 
that facility could refuse to participate in the performance of an abortion 
under RCW 9.02.150, doing so would void the contract because it would 
prevent the State from fulfilling its statutory obligation under the Act.306 
Suppose instead that the provider accepts the State’s conditions—which 
does not burden the provider’s free exercise—and agrees to provide 
referrals at its facility. The provider’s doctors could arguably decline to 
give the abortion referrals and information under RCW 9.02.150,307 but 
opting out would force the healthcare facility to alter staffing decisions 
to ensure that a willing physician was always working. This could result 
in the termination of the unwilling doctor as a cost-cutting measure.308 
Pressure that forces an employee to choose between her job and 
violating a tenet of her faith is a substantial burden on the exercise of 
religion.309 Having found a coercive effect on doctors, the next step is to 
subject the law to strict scrutiny. 
306. See infra Part II.C. 
307. See WASH. REV. CODE § 9.02.150 (2014) (providing that “[n]o person . . . may be 
required . . . to participate in the performance of an abortion if such person . . . objects to so doing” 
(emphasis added)). The argument would be that referral qualifies as participation. 
308. See Stormans Inc. v. Selecky, 844 F. Supp. 2d 1172, 1177 (W.D. Wash. 2012). Note that in 
Stormans, this pressure existed only because the pharmacy needed one pharmacist on duty at a time. 
Id. As objecting pharmacists could opt out of the delivery rule, the pharmacy had to staff two 
pharmacists to accommodate the objection. Id. This incentivized the pharmacy to replace the 
unwilling pharmacist with a willing pharmacist. Id. This problem could be easily avoided in a larger 
healthcare facility, where more than one physician is required at a time. 
309. See id. at 1176–77, 1199. 
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B. The Reproductive Privacy Act Furthers the State’s Compelling 
Interests in Health and Safety, and Ensures that Women Have the 
Opportunity to Make an Autonomous, Informed Choice 
To satisfy the first prong of strict scrutiny, the State must demonstrate 
that the law furthers a compelling government interest.310 It is well 
established under Washington law that the government has a compelling 
interest in furthering the health and safety of its residents.311 Ensuring 
that women wishing to terminate their pregnancies have access to 
abortion directly furthers this interest.312 Despite the prevalence of birth 
control, in 2006, forty-nine percent of pregnancies in Washington were 
unplanned,313 and the majority of women who had an abortion were 
using contraceptives during the time in which they became pregnant.314 
This is especially true for low-income and minority women. According 
to a 2006 study, between 1994 and 2001, the unintended pregnancy rate 
in the lowest income bracket was four times higher than in the upper 
income bracket.315 Hispanic and black women were two and three times, 
respectively, more likely than white women to have an unintended 
pregnancy.316 The disproportionate pregnancy rates result from 
contextual dynamics such as poverty, racism, and the structure of health 
services.317 
These unwanted pregnancies have numerous undesirable health 
outcomes: “inadequate or delayed initiation of prenatal care, use of 
310. First United Methodist Church of Seattle v. Hearing Exam’r for the Seattle Landmarks Pres. 
Bd., 129 Wash. 2d 238, 250, 916 P.2d 374, 380 (1996). 
311. See Backlund v. Bd. of Comm’rs of King Cnty. Hosp. Dist. 2, 106 Wash. 2d 632, 642, 724 
P.2d 981, 987 (1986) (“In the area of health and safety, governmental interests often override 
individual objections to regulations relating thereto.”); City of Sumner v. First Baptist Church of 
Sumner, Wash., 97 Wash. 2d 1, 9, 639 P.2d 1358, 1363 (1982) (“It is also generally conceded that 
there is a valid state interest in applying reasonable health, fire and safety standards to private, 
religious schools.”); State ex rel. Holcomb v. Armstrong, 39 Wash. 2d 860, 864, 239 P.2d 545, 548 
(1952) (“Here the public interest threatened is the health of all of the students and employees of the 
university. It may be lawfully protected.”). 
312. See John Santelli et al., The Measurement and Meaning of Unintended Pregnancy, 35 
PERSP. ON SEXUAL & REPROD. HEALTH, Mar./Apr. 2003, at 94, 95 (describing the health 
consequences associated with a lack of abortion access), available at http://www.guttmacher.org/ 
pubs/journals/3509403.pdf. 
313. Lawrence B. Finer & Kathryn Kost, Unintended Pregnancy Rates at the State Level, 43 
PERSP. ON SEXUAL & REPROD. HEALTH, June 2011, at 78, 81 tbl.1, available at 
http://www.guttmacher.org/pubs/psrh/full/4307811.pdf. 
314.  Cohen, supra note 180, at 8, 9. 
315. Finer & Kost, supra note 313, at 78. 
316. Id. 
317. Santelli et al., supra note 312, at 97.  
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tobacco and alcohol during pregnancy, premature birth, low birth 
weight, lack of breast-feeding, and negative physical and mental health 
outcomes among children.”318 Unintended pregnancies that result in live 
births are associated with physical abuse and violence—both during 
pregnancy and the twelve months before conception—“and with 
household dysfunction and exposure to psychological, physical or sexual 
abuse during the woman’s childhood.”319 Further, not having access to 
abortion exacerbates these conditions. “In countries where abortion is 
illegal and unsafe, unintended pregnancy is a major contributor to 
maternal morbidity and mortality. Abortion is estimated to have caused 
400,000 of the 700,000 deaths resulting from unintended pregnancy 
worldwide between January 1995 and December 2000.”320 In the United 
States, where abortion is legal, abortion-related mortality and morbidity 
are less common than birth-related mortality and morbidity.321 
In addition to an interest in health and safety, the State has a 
compelling interest in ensuring that women can make an informed 
decision, unencumbered by exterior pressures. Courts recognize a state 
interest in protecting the fundamental right of choice.322 They have also 
identified a compelling interest in ensuring that a woman’s choice is 
well informed.323 The Privacy Act directly furthers these interests by 
preventing the State from influencing the decision making process, and 
by increasing access to abortion information and counseling so that 
women are familiar with the abortion procedure and know that state 
funding is an option for those who qualify.324 Accordingly, the Act 
furthers the State’s compelling interest in health and safety and in 
ensuring that women make an informed, autonomous decision. 
318. Finer & Kost, supra note 313, at 78. 
319. Santelli et al., supra note 312, at 95.  
320. Id.  
321. Id.  
322. Madsen v. Women’s Health Ctr., Inc., 512 U.S. 753, 767 (1994) (recognizing the state’s 
interest in protecting “a woman’s freedom to seek lawful medical or counseling services in 
connection with her pregnancy”); Bering v. SHARE, 106 Wash. 2d 212, 229–30, 721 P.2d 918, 929 
(1986) (“Given this court’s previous commitment to personal privacy, protection of [the] right [of 
choice], even from private invasion, constitutes a compelling State interest . . . .” (citations 
omitted)). 
323. See supra note 277 and accompanying text.  
324. See generally WASH. REV. CODE § 9.02.160 (2014) (requiring that the State provide 
substantially equivalent abortion care). 
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C. The Reproductive Privacy Act Uses the Least Restrictive Means 
To survive strict scrutiny, once the State demonstrates its compelling 
interest, it must also show that the “means chosen to achieve its 
compelling interest are necessary and the least restrictive available.”325 
The Washington State jurisprudence interpreting this requirement is 
relatively undeveloped. The most concrete principle to emerge from the 
Washington cases is that the least restrictive means requirement does not 
require the State to create an all-out religious exemption to 
accommodate free exercise.326 In other words, the regulation must be the 
least restrictive imposition on religion that can still satisfy the 
compelling government interest.327 The State need not subrogate its 
interest to accommodate the religious belief.328 For example, in State v. 
Motherwell,329 three religious counselors were convicted of violating 
RCW 26.44.030(1), which required them to report incidents of suspected 
child abuse.330 The counselors, who were told about three separate 
incidents in the course of counseling,331 argued that the statute interfered 
with their ability to counsel their congregation.332 In holding that the 
State used the least restrictive means, the Court noted that the State was 
only requiring individuals to report child abuse, not take any steps to 
prevent it.333 Nevertheless, exempting religious officials from the 
reporting requirement would inhibit the State’s fulfillment of its 
compelling interest of preventing child abuse.334 
The Motherwell decision follows directly from the Supreme Court’s 
decision in United States v. Lee.335 In that case, the Court denied the 
constitutional challenge of an Amish sole proprietor who claimed that 
the imposition of the social security tax violated his free exercise rights 
and those of his Amish employees.336 In denying the farmer’s claim, the 
325. First Covenant Church of Seattle v. City of Seattle, 120 Wash. 2d 203, 227, 840 P.2d 174, 
187 (1992). 
326. See Open Door Baptist Church v. Clark Cnty., 140 Wash. 2d 143, 167, 995 P.2d 33, 46 
(2000). 
327. State v. Motherwell, 114 Wash. 2d 353, 365, 788 P.2d 1066, 1072 (1990). 
328. Id. at 365–66, 788 P.2d at 1072–73. 
329. Id. at 353, 788 P.2d 1066. 
330. Id. at 355, 788 P.2d at 1067. 
331. Id. at 356, 788 P.2d at 1067. 
332. Id. at 362, 788 P.2d at 1070–71. 
333. Id. at 366, 788 P.2d at 1073. 
334. Id. 
335. 455 U.S. 252 (1982).  
336. Id. at 254. 
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Court accepted the burden the social security system placed on Lee’s 
religion.337 Nonetheless, the burden was essential to accomplish the 
government’s overriding interest because the tax system would not 
function if various denominations could object to paying taxes.338 Thus, 
under Lee, the state need not accommodate religious conduct to the 
extent that the accommodation “would radically restrict the operating 
latitude of the legislature.”339 
The Reproductive Privacy Act uses the least restrictive means. The 
Act potentially burdens doctors’ religious exercise through the referral 
requirement. Although doctors could arguably opt out of the referral 
requirement through RCW 9.02.150, doing so could force a facility to 
alter staffing decisions, which may result in the firing of an objecting 
doctor. The State could alleviate the burden on doctors by waiving the 
requirement that it only provide funding to providers that also provide 
referrals, even if the provider itself does not have a free exercise claim. 
The question is whether Washington could satisfy its interest without the 
referral. The answer is no. First and foremost, without the referral, the 
State could not meet its statutory obligation to provide substantially 
equivalent abortion care under RCW 9.02.160.340 Moreover, granting an 
exemption would undermine the State’s interest. The Catholic 
Healthcare Directives forbid abortion or abortion referral in all 
circumstances.341 Given the ubiquity of Catholic healthcare in the 
Washington market, allowing doctors to opt out of providing referrals 
would create the “myriad exemptions” that so troubled the Court in 
Lee.342 When the state’s success depends on the administration of a 
comprehensive, uniform system, it need not grant religious exemptions 
if doing so would destroy that uniformity.343 That is the case here. 
Granting an exemption that could encompass over forty percent of the 
market would undermine the State’s interest. The Washington State 
Constitution does not require the State to handcuff itself in order to 
337. Id. at 257. 
338. Id. at 259–60. 
339. Id. at 259 (quoting Braunfeld v. Brown, 366 U.S. 599, 606 (1961)). 
340. See supra Part II.C. 
341. See U.S. CONFERENCE OF CATHOLIC BISHOPS, ETHICAL AND RELIGIOUS DIRECTIVES FOR 
CATHOLIC HEALTH CARE SERVICES 26 (2009), available at http://www.usccb.org/issues-and-action/ 
human-life-and-dignity/health-care/upload/Ethical-Religious-Directives-Catholic-Health-Care-
Services-fifth-edition-2009.pdf; Erik Eckholm, Bishops Sued Over Anti-Abortion Policies at 
Catholic Hospitals, N.Y. TIMES (Dec. 2, 2013), http://www.nytimes.com/2013/12/03/us/lawsuit-
challenges-anti-abortion-policies-at-catholic-hospitals.html?_r=0. 
342. Lee, 455 U.S. at 260. 
343. See id. 
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accommodate religious beliefs. Accordingly, the Act passes strict 
scrutiny under the Washington Constitution. It furthers a compelling 
government interest in health and ensuring women make an informed 
choice. Additionally, the Act utilizes the least restrictive means because 
accommodating religious objectors would not only undermine the 
State’s interest, it would cause the State to violate the Act. 
CONCLUSION 
In response to the federal limitations on a woman’s right of choice, 
Washington enacted the Reproductive Privacy Act. It addresses concerns 
that selective appropriation of state resources may influence a woman’s 
choice. Accordingly, the Act provides that, any time the State provides 
maternity care, it must also provide substantially equivalent abortion 
care. It also forbids the State from discriminating against the right of 
choice. 
Although the Act was enacted in 1992, it has only been interpreted in 
one Washington Attorney General opinion, which left many interpretive 
issues open. The lack of answers has been troubling, especially in recent 
years, with the growth of Catholic healthcare in the state. Many of 
Washington’s public hospital districts, which are subject to the Act, are 
considering agreements with Catholic providers that may cut off access 
to state resources for abortion. This Comment seeks to interpret the 
Reproductive Privacy Act and provide guidance for courts in assessing 
whether the State has met its statutory obligation under the Act. Mainly, 
it seeks to answer questions left unanswered by the Attorney General 
opinion—especially what constitutes substantially equivalent abortion 
care, and how to harmonize RCW 9.02.160 and RCW 9.02.100(4). 
In addition, this Comment’s interpretation of the Act will survive a 
free exercise challenge. It argues that potential plaintiffs would only be 
entitled to deferential Smith scrutiny in a First Amendment challenge. 
Accordingly, plaintiffs would likely proceed under the Washington 
Constitution. Applying strict scrutiny, the Comment argues that the Act 
has a coercive effect on doctors’ religious exercise. The Act, however, 
likely passes strict scrutiny because it furthers a compelling interest in 
health and ensuring women make an informed choice, and uses the least 
restrictive means. 
 
 
